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I. INTRODUCTION
A continuing source of frustration for the appellate judge is the review of
appeals by indigent defendants whose appointed counsel can find no
meritorious issues and files what is referred to as an Anders brief, required
by the U.S. Supreme Court’s holding in Anders v. California.1 These
appeals raise several problems for the appellate court. They require the
devotion of court resources and time to appeals already deemed by counsel
to have no merit; they require the court to review the record much more
meticulously than in appeals raising meritorious issues; and they demand
that the court raise, sua sponte, any issues that it deems arguably
meritorious, even when counsel has not briefed those issues. In this respect,
the appellate court treats this class of appeals in a significantly different way
from other appeals. Because of these and other difficulties, several state
appellate courts have adopted alternative procedures to avoid the Anders
dilemma, while others have struggled with its application. The purpose of
this Article is to examine what Anders and its progeny have required of
state appellate courts, to determine how Anders has been applied in those
* Judge, Florida Fourth District Court of Appeal. B.A. magna cum laude, 1971, The
Colorado College; J.D. with high honors, 1974, University of Florida; LL.M., 1995,
University of Virginia. This Article is adapted from a thesis submitted by the author in partial
fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of Master of Laws in the Judicial Process at the
University of Virginia.
1. 386 U.S. 738, reh’g denied, 388 U.S. 924 (1967).
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courts,2 and to suggest some solutions to the problems Anders raises for the
courts.
II. THE PATH TO ANDERS
The constitutional underpinnings of Anders and its progeny rely
alternatively on both the Sixth and Fourteenth Amendments to the U.S.
Constitution. These underpinnings resulted from a steady extension by the
U.S. Supreme Court of rights to indigent criminal defendants. The attempt
to satisfy both constitutional concerns in Anders forms the basis of the
conflicting demands placed upon reviewing courts.
The U.S. Supreme Court first addressed the application of the Sixth
Amendment right to counsel in 1932, when a poor, black defendant was
sentenced to death without the assistance of counsel. In Powell v. Alabama,3
the Court held that the Sixth Amendment requires the appointment of trial
counsel for indigent defendants in criminal cases.4 It declared that the right
of an accused to be represented by counsel is a fundamental right under the
Sixth Amendment.5 Later, in Gideon v. Wainwright,6 the Court held that the
Sixth Amendment right to counsel applies to the states through the Equal
Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.7 This decision thus
reinforced the Court’s assertion that fairness in criminal trials requires
counsel to represent defendants in court proceedings. It noted not only that
the government spends substantial sums of money securing attorneys to
prosecute defendants, but also that a lay defendant is essentially no match
for a trained lawyer representing the State.8
The issue of a defendant’s rights in the appellate process was first
addressed in the context of an indigent defendant’s right to a transcript of
the proceedings, which was deemed essential to prosecuting an appeal from
a conviction.9 In Griffin v. Illinois,10 the Court, while acknowledging that
the federal Constitution did not require the State to provide appellate review
of criminal convictions, held that where such review was provided, it must
be done in a manner that did not discriminate against indigent defendants.11
Refusing to provide a transcript to an indigent defendant in a situation in
which a wealthy defendant could secure one discriminated against the
2. To gather information for this Article, a questionnaire was sent to the chief judges of
state intermediate appellate and supreme courts. Responses were received from most courts.
The results of the survey are contained in the appendix to this Article.
3. 287 U.S. 45 (1932).
4. Id.
5. See id. at 68.
6. 372 U.S. 335 (1963).
7. Id.
8. Id. at 344-45.
9. See Griffin v. Illinois, 351 U.S. 12 (1956).
10. Id.
11. Id. at 18.
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indigent defendant and thus violated the Equal Protection Clause.12
Although the Griffin decision stressed equal protection, it rested on the
assumption that the appellant had meritorious points to raise and was unable
to pursue those points solely because of the absence of a transcript, thus
implicating due process concerns. The Court found that “[b]oth equal
protection and due process emphasize the central aim of our entire judicial
system—all people charged with [a] crime must, so far as the law is
concerned, ‘stand on an equality before the bar of justice in every American
court.’”13 Griffin is grounded on the belief that due process has been denied
when error has occurred in a conviction and that error cannot be remedied
on appeal in the absence of the transcript. By requiring the submission of a
transcript without providing the means to obtain it, the State violated the
defendant’s due process rights. However, the Court’s strongest statement in
its opinion relied on equal protection: “There can be no equal justice where
the kind of trial a man gets depends on the amount of money he has.
Destitute defendants must be afforded as adequate appellate review as
defendants who have money enough to buy transcripts.”14 In Eskridge v.
Washington State Board,15 the Court reaffirmed a defendant’s right to a free
transcript and disapproved a state procedure that allowed a trial court to
deny an indigent defendant’s motion for transcription of his trial solely on
the trial court’s conclusion that no reversible error occurred in the trial.16
The Court relied on the equal protection concerns expressed in Griffin.17
The Court, in Lane v. Brown,18 reiterated its assessment that the Equal
Protection Clause requires that an indigent defendant be provided a
transcript for the purpose of mounting an appeal of a conviction.19 In that
case, an Indiana defendant sentenced to death wanted to appeal the denial of
a writ of coram nobis, but the public defender assigned to represent him
determined that no meritorious error could be asserted on appeal.20 The
Indiana courts had interpreted the statute governing public defenders as
allowing only a public defender to request a transcript for an indigent
defendant.21 The indigent defendant could not secure the transcript
himself.22 After the public defender refused to appeal, the defendant
requested both a transcript and the appointment of new counsel to represent
him in appealing the denial of the writ.23 Although the Indiana courts
12.
13.
14.
15.
16.
17.
18.
19.
20.
21.
22.
23.

Id. at 19.
Id. at 17 (citing Chambers v. Florida, 309 U.S. 227, 241 (1940)).
Id. at 19.
357 U.S. 214 (1958).
Id.
Id. at 216.
372 U.S. 477 (1963).
Id.
Id. at 481-82.
Id. at 481.
Id.
Id. at 482.
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refused to grant relief, the federal appellate courts determined that denial of
the transcript was a violation of equal protection of the law where the State
had established a right to appeal but denied the indigent defendant that right
solely because he could not afford the transcript.24 The Supreme Court
agreed and, in what appears to be a precursor to Anders itself, stated, “The
provision before us confers upon a state officer [i.e., public defender]
outside the judicial system power to take from an indigent all hope of any
appeal at all. Such a procedure, based on indigency alone, does not meet
constitutional standards.”25 Thus, after Eskridge and Lane, neither the trial
court’s determination that no reversible error had occurred nor the
appointed counsel’s determination that the appeal lacked merit could
prevent a defendant from obtaining a transcript of the proceedings if one
were essential to the effective presentation of the issues to the appellate
court. In summarizing the foregoing line of cases, Justice Rehnquist noted
in Ross v. Moffitt,26 “The decisions discussed above stand for the
proposition that a State cannot arbitrarily cut off appeal rights for indigents
while leaving open avenues of appeal for more affluent persons.”27
The immediate predecessor to Anders was decided in the same term as
Lane. In Douglas v. California,28 the Court held that an indigent defendant
was entitled to have counsel appointed to represent him on appeal of his
conviction and sentence.29 The defendants in Douglas had filed an appeal as
of right to a California district court.30 A California rule of criminal
procedure provided that the appellate court could make an independent
review of the record to determine whether it would be an advantage to the
defendant or helpful to the appellate court to have counsel represent the
defendant.31 Relying on that rule, the district court determined that “no
good whatever could be served by appointment of counsel.”32
In reversing the decision, the Supreme Court concluded that refusing the
appellant counsel to represent him on appeal amounted to a denial of equal
protection.33 If an appellant could afford counsel, then the appellate court
would determine the merits of the case based upon a record with full written
briefs pointing out errors.34 But if the appellant were indigent, only manifest
errors appearing on the face of the record—errors that might be noted by the
appellate court—would result in a reversal of his conviction.35 Matters of
24.
25.
26.
27.
28.
29.
30.
31.
32.
33.
34.
35.

Lane v. Brown, 372 U.S. 477, 483 (1963).
Id. at 485.
417 U.S. 600 (1974).
Id. at 607.
372 U.S. 353 (1963).
Id.
Id. at 354.
Id. at 355.
Id.
Id. at 357-58.
Id. at 356.
Id. at 355-56.
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“hidden merit” would not be presented for review.36 The Court therefore held
that the independent review by the appellate court was not sufficient because a
rich appellant could require a court to give attention to the written brief and
the arguments presented, whereas the indigent defendant would have no such
ability.37
There is lacking that equality demanded by the Fourteenth Amendment
where the rich man, who appeals as of right, enjoys the benefit of counsel’s
examination into the record, research of the law, and marshalling of
arguments on his behalf, while the indigent, already burdened by a
preliminary determination that his case is without merit, is forced to shift
for himself. The indigent, where the record is unclear or the errors are
hidden, has only the right to a meaningless ritual, while the rich man has a
meaningful appeal.38

Notably, the Court did not determine that the appellant was entitled to counsel
under a Sixth Amendment claim but, rather, premised its decision on the
same equal protection analysis used in the prior line of transcript cases.39
In a strong dissent, Justice Clark noted that Griffin did not compel the
result of requiring the appointment of counsel.40 Even in Griffin, the Court
acknowledged that a State could provide substitutes for a full transcript on
appeal.41 Here, according to Justice Clark, California had provided a
substitute for appointment of counsel by having the district court complete an
independent review of the record to determine whether it would be to the
defendant’s advantage to have appointed counsel.42 Because Justice Clark did
not view the appellate court’s duty as a meaningless ritual, he contended that
neither the Equal Protection Clause nor the Due Process Clause could require
more than the independent review provided by the California rules.43
Justice Harlan also dissented, explaining that the California procedure did
not create a distinction between rich and poor appellants, but a distinction
between appeals having merit and those deemed frivolous.44 In short, Justice
36. Id.
37. Id. at 357-58.
38. Id.
39. Id. at 356.
40. Id. at 358 (Clark, J., dissenting).
41. 351 U.S. 12 (1956).
42. Douglas, 372 U.S. at 359 (Clark, J., dissenting).
43. Id. (Clark, J., dissenting).
44. Id. at 362 (Harlan, J., dissenting). Contending that the only constitutional basis on
which California’s procedure could be evaluated was whether it comported with due process,
id. at 363, Justice Harlan noted that appellate review was not in itself required by the
Fourteenth Amendment. Id. at 365. Thus, Justice Harlan distilled the issue as one of whether the
State’s rules regarding the appointment of counsel on appeal were arbitrary and unreasonable. Id. As
the procedure was like that of the Court’s itself in reviewing petitions for discretionary writs, Justice
Harlan suggested that the Court did not see itself as being anything other than completely
conscientious when reviewing the thousand pro se petitions filed with it each year; he thus rebutted
the majority’s argument that the California court review was no substitute for appointment of counsel.
Id. at 365-66.
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Harlan saw no constitutional impediment to California’s procedure because
it saved the State from the needless expense of providing attorneys to
indigent defendants in frivolous cases45—a distinction that would not violate
either due process or equal protection considerations.
Noting that the majority of the Court used both due process and equal
protection rationales to reach the results in the Griffin/Douglas line of cases,
in Ross v. Moffitt,46 the Court explained the different factors involved in
each:
“Due Process” emphasizes fairness between the State and the individual
dealing with the State, regardless of how other individuals in the same
situation may be treated. “Equal protection,” on the other hand,
emphasizes disparity in treatment by a State between classes of
individuals whose situations are arguably indistinguishable.47

II. ANDERS V. CALIFORNIA AND BEYOND
A. An Advocate for Indigent Defendants
Given the result in Douglas in 1963, the step to Anders four years later
was a short one. The Court in Douglas had determined that without the
appointment of counsel, California’s independent review by the appellate
court was insufficient to guarantee equal protection to the indigent
defendant.48 How, then, could the appointment of counsel alone be
sufficient unless counsel filed a brief arguing the merits of the case?
Charles Anders was convicted in the 1950s of felony possession of
marijuana.49 He appealed, but his appointed counsel sent to the court a
letter concluding that there was no merit to the appeal.50 Anders then filed
a pro se brief.51 The court affirmed his conviction.52 Six years later,
Anders filed a petition for writ of habeas corpus seeking to reopen his case
by virtue of a claim that he had been deprived of counsel on appeal.53 After
his petition was denied all the way to the California Supreme Court, the
U.S. Supreme Court in granting review, noted that the appellant had raised
as an issue in his petition that both the judge and prosecutor had commented
While the majority distinguished the procedure in Douglas from the Supreme Court’s
procedure on the basis that the California procedure was an appeal as of right, Justice Harlan
considered that a meaningless distinction and pointed to Lane v. Brown, 372 U.S. 477 (1963),
which required the presentation of a transcript on a postconviction proceeding. Id. at 366.
45. Id.
46. 417 U.S. 600 (1974).
47. Id. at 609.
48. Douglas, 372 U.S. at 357-58.
49. Anders v. California, 386 U.S. 738, 739, reh’g denied, 388 U.S. 924 (1967).
50. Id.
51. Id. at 740.
52. Id.
53. Id.
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on his failure to testify, a comment that the Court had recently held to be
constitutional error.54
The Court’s analysis was principally premised on its determination to
eliminate discrimination against indigent defendants in the presentation of
their first appeals. Although the Court mentioned Gideon’s Sixth
Amendment right to counsel, the reference was in the context of its
application to the states through the Fourteenth Amendment.55
The appointed counsel in Anders had reviewed the record and written the
appellate court a letter stating: “I am of the opinion that there is no merit to
the appeal.”56 Significantly, the Court distinguished between appeals with
no merit and appeals that are entirely “frivolous” but failed to explain the
distinction.57 The Court was concerned that California’s procedures
completely failed to provide the indigent defendant with counsel who
appeared in the role of advocate.58 In formulating the procedure to be
followed by counsel and courts in appeals by indigent defendants, it stated:
The constitutional requirement of substantial equality and fair process
can only be attained where counsel acts in the role of an active advocate
in behalf of his client, as opposed to that of amicus curiae. The no-merit
letter and the procedure it triggers do not reach that dignity. Counsel
should, and can with honor and without conflict, be of more assistance to
his client and to the court. His role as advocate requires that he support
his client’s appeal to the best of his ability. Of course, if counsel finds his
case to be wholly frivolous, after a conscientious examination of it, he
should so advise the court and request permission to withdraw. That
request must, however, be accompanied by a brief referring to anything
in the record that might arguably support the appeal. A copy of counsel’s
brief should be furnished the indigent and time allowed him to raise any
points that he chooses; the court—not counsel—then proceeds, after a full
examination of all the proceedings, to decide whether the case is wholly
frivolous. If it so finds it may grant counsel’s request to withdraw and
dismiss the appeal insofar as federal requirements are concerned, or
proceed to a decision on the merits, if state law so requires. On the other
hand, if it finds any of the legal points arguable on their merits (and
therefore not frivolous) it must, prior to decision, afford the indigent the
assistance of counsel to argue the appeal.
This requirement would not force appointed counsel to brief his case
against his client but would merely afford the latter that advocacy which a
nonindigent defendant is able to obtain. It would also induce the court to
pursue all the more vigorously its own review because of the ready

54.
Anders.
55.
56.
57.
58.

Id. Having lost the battle in Douglas, Justice Clark wrote the majority opinion in
See id. at 742.
Id. (emphasis added).
Id. at 744.
Id. at 743.
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references not only to the record, but also to the legal authorities as
furnished it by counsel.59

The Court’s requirements present a logical inconsistency, noted by
Justice Stewart in his dissent. If the appointed attorney can raise “anything
that might arguably support an appeal,” then, while it may be without
“merit,” it would not be entirely frivolous.60 Nevertheless, the Court
required the appellate court to make its own review of the record and to
decide whether the appeal was wholly frivolous. Ironically, the very reason
that the Court considered counsel necessary in Douglas was to bring forth
matters of “hidden merit.”61 Yet, under Anders, those matters may also
escape review based only on an examination of the record proper.
B. Insufficient Guidance
The Anders opinion raises concerns about the appellate court’s method
of reviewing Anders-type cases. First, Anders draws a distinction between
meritless and wholly frivolous cases, as noted by some early critics of the
case: “[Anders] is seen as having established a rarefied distinction between
appeals which are merely meritless and those which are wholly frivolous.
Under Anders, so interpreted, the constitutional guarantee of effective
assistance of counsel assures representation to criminal appellants for
meritless, but not for frivolous, appeals.”62 Other commentators viewed
Anders as addressing solely the manner in which counsel communicates to
the court the conclusion that the appeal was meritless, not the conclusion
itself.63 Certainly, the primary concern of appellate counsel has been not in
how to communicate the conclusion that an appeal is meritless, but in the
very suggestion that a client’s case lacks any substance, for that has been
seen as contrary to ethical standards requiring zealous representation of the
client.64 In practice, however, issues presented for review in Anders briefs
frequently raise questions that cannot be deemed frivolous, even though
they will not support a reversal because, for example, a lack of a timely
59. Id. at 744-45.
60. Id. at 746 (Stewart, J., dissenting).
61. Douglas v. California, 372 U.S. 353, 356 (1963).
62. Robert Hermann, Frivolous Criminal Appeals , 47 N.Y.U. L. REV. 701, 705 (1972).
63. See, e.g., Note, The Right to Counsel in “Frivolous” Criminal Appeals: A
Reevaluation of the Guarantees of Anders v. California, 67 TEX. L. REV. 181, 188 (1988)
[hereinafter Reevaluation].
64. See, e.g., Hermann, supra note 62, at 705. If counsel is constitutionally required to
pursue meritless claims but not frivolous claims, there exists an ethical conflict with the
prohibition against pursuing such claims under the Code of Professional Responsibility. See,
e.g., Charles Pengilly, Never Cry Anders: The Ethical Dilemma of Counsel Appointed To
Pursue a Frivolous Criminal Appeal , 9 CRIM. JUST. J. 45, 51 (1986). A different view is taken
in Reevaluation, supra, note 63, at 190-91. The author argues that counsel should not speculate
on the likely success of an appeal but must evaluate the record more as an advocate,
acknowledging the very low threshold for the determination that an appeal is meritorious under
the Anders meaning. Id.
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objection fails to preserve the issue for review. This, in and of itself,
presents a dilemma for the appellate court. If, for instance, there were a
clear error in admitting evidence to which there was no objection, should
counsel file an Anders brief noting that the issue is one of arguable merit but
is procedurally barred? Or should counsel file a standard brief and compel
the State to raise the issue of lack of preservation in the answer brief? In the
author’s experience, such issues have been presented both ways. Some
counsel file an Anders brief that acknowledges lack of preservation and
triggers the court’s independent review of the entire record. Other counsel
file a brief arguing the error but without acknowledging its lack of
preservation—a brief that prompts an answer brief from the State raising
preservation but does not trigger the appellate court’s independent duty to
review the record for issues of arguable error. Anders thus leads to
inconsistency in the presentation of issues to the appellate court, and this
results in inconsistency in the method of review by the court.
Another related issue not fully addressed in the Anders opinion is
whether the appellate court’s review is limited to the arguable points raised
or whether Anders requires the court to raise any issues it finds from the
record. The court must decide whether the case is frivolous, but if it finds
any legal point arguable on merit, it must require further briefing. If the
appellate court’s review is limited to the points raised in the appointed
counsel’s brief, then the appellate court performs its review similarly to that
of any other criminal appeal. Certainly, if the court must determine whether
the appeal is frivolous, it cannot ignore those issues that would not be
frivolous if properly raised by the appellant. But if it considers issues not
raised by counsel, then it is performing for the indigent appellant a function
that it does not provide for any other class of appellee.
C. The Evolution of Anders
1. Early Formulations of the Reviewing Court’s Function
The analysis used by the Court in Ross v. Moffitt,65 decided almost eight
years after Anders, supports a conclusion that the appellate court would not
be required to perform an issue-searching function. Under the due process
analysis, a State need not provide an appeal at all.66 Therefore, the attorney
for the indigent defendant acts as a “sword” rather than a “shield” against
the State.67 Unfairness of process results “only if indigents are singled out
65. 417 U.S. 600 (1974).
66. Id. at 611 (citing McKane v. Durston, 153 U.S. 684 (1984)).
67. See id. at 610-11.
The defendant needs an attorney on appeal not as a shield to protect him against
being “haled into court” by the State and stripped of his presumption of innocence,
but rather as a sword to upset the prior determination of guilt. This difference is
significant for, while no one would agree that the State may simply dispense with the
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by the State and denied meaningful access to the appellate system because
of their poverty,” an aspect that should be considered under an equal
protection analysis.68 But in making that analysis, the Fourteenth
Amendment requires only that the state appellate system be “free of
unreasoned distinctions . . . and that indigents have an adequate opportunity
to present their claims fairly within the adversary system.”69
When counsel files an Anders brief for an indigent defendant whose
appeal presents no meritorious points on review, he has as adequate an
opportunity as any other litigant to present his arguments.70 Requiring the
appellate court to go further and itself search the record for points of
arguable merit, however, would give the indigent Anders appellant an
additional right not granted to other litigants. Nevertheless, this precise
point was not made in Ross, and subsequent decisions indicate that the
Court has not considered the issue.
Despite Anders’ apparent requirement that the appellate court itself
search the record for potentially meritorious issues, the Supreme Court
subsequently held in Jones v. Barnes71 that an attorney is not required to
raise every nonfrivolous issue requested by the client.72 “Neither Anders nor
any other decision of this Court suggests, however, that the indigent
defendant has a constitutional right to compel appointed counsel to press
nonfrivolous points requested by the client, if counsel, as a matter of
professional judgment, decides not to present those points.”73 Noting that
Anders required counsel to make a conscientious examination of the record,
the Court observed that compelling counsel to raise every nonfrivolous issue
that the client directs “seriously undermines the ability of counsel to present
the client’s case in accord with counsel’s professional evaluation.”74
Therefore, counsel is told that if at least one issue of arguable merit is
raised, counsel may exercise independent professional judgment and does
not have to raise any other issues should counsel deem other issues too
weak to present a good chance for reversal. But, given Anders, if counsel
deems all of the issues nonmeritorious, counsel must file a brief raising all
issues of arguable merit.75 Under Jones v. Barnes, if counsel raises one
meritorious issue, the appellate court has no independent duty to search the
trial stage of proceedings without a criminal defendant’s consent, it is clear that the
State need not provide any appeal at all.
Id.
68. Id.
69. Id. at 612 (citations omitted).
70. Under the Ross analysis, the preparation of an Anders brief by counsel would fulfill
the Equal Protection Clause. Cf. id.
71. 463 U.S. 745 (1980).
72. Id. at 751.
73. Id.
74. Id.
75. Anders v. California, 386 U.S. 738, 744, reh’g denied, 388 U.S. 924 (1967).
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record for other nonfrivolous issues.76 It is only when no issues of arguable
merit are raised that the appellate court searches and raises issues of
arguable merit for the indigent appellant.
2. Evitts v. Lucey: Reliance on Due Process and Equal Protection
The Supreme Court returned to a due process analysis of the Anders
issue in Evitts v. Lucey.77 Interpreting Anders as establishing a due process
right to effective assistance of counsel on an indigent’s first appeal as of
right, the Court held that counsel’s failure to follow procedural rules,
resulting in dismissal of the indigent defendant’s first appeal as of right,
denied the appellant due process.78 The Court reviewed its analysis of the
two constitutional principles involved in the Griffin/Douglas/Anders line of
cases and concluded that the results in those cases relied on both equal
protection and due process principles.79 While acknowledging the equal
protection claim, the Court observed that Griffin also stood on due process
grounds. It held that allowing a case to be decided on appeal by reason of
the presence or absence of a transcript “also violated due process principles
because it decided the appeal in a way that was arbitrary with respect to the
issues involved.”80 Moreover, the Evitts majority read in a strong due
process justification for the Anders result and noted that Anders and Jones
v. Barnes “rest on the premise that a State must supply indigent criminal
appellants with attorneys who can provide specified types of assistance—
that is, that such appellants have a right to effective assistance of counsel.”81
Summarizing its reliance on both the due process and equal protection
claims in that line of cases, the Court stated:
In cases like Griffin and Douglas, due process concerns were involved
because the States involved had set up a system of appeals as of right but
had refused to offer each defendant a fair opportunity to obtain an
adjudication on the merits of his appeal. Equal protection concerns were
involved because the State treated a class of defendants—indigent ones—
differently for purposes of offering them a meaningful appeal. Both of
these concerns were implicated in the Griffin and Douglas cases and both
Clauses supported the decisions reached by this Court.82

Thus, after Evitts v. Lucey, the Anders procedure must meet and address
both the Due Process and Equal Protection clauses of the Constitution.
76. 463 U.S. 745 (1980).
77. 469 U.S. 387 (1985).
78. Id. at 394, 404.
79. Id. at 405.
80. Id. at 404.
81. Id. However, the Court specifically noted that the case did not require it to “decide
the appropriate standards for judging claims of ineffective assistance of appellate counsel.” Id.
at 392.
82. Id. at 405.
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3. McCoy v. Wisconsin: Clarifying the Attorney’s Role and the
Court’s Independent Review Function
Less than three years later, the Court again addressed Anders in McCoy
v. Court of Appeals of Wisconsin District 1. 83 The Wisconsin Supreme
Court had adopted a rule of criminal procedure that required the appointed
attorney for an indigent to include in the Anders brief “anything in the
record that might arguably support the appeal and a discussion of why the
issue lacks merit.”84 Counsel in McCoy filed a brief raising four arguments
for reversal but concluded that further proceedings would be frivolous and
without arguable merit.85 Declining to inform the court, in accordance with
the rule, as to why the points on appeal were without merit, counsel
contended that to do so would be unethical and contrary to the effective
advocacy requirement of Anders.86 The Wisconsin Supreme Court disagreed
with counsel’s characterization of the conflict presented and held that the
rule only required counsel to fulfill the dual duties to the client and the
court.87 It stated that informing the reviewing court of authorities against the
arguments made is a duty that all attorneys have to the court to assist it in
making a correct decision.88
After reviewing the requirements of Anders, the United States Supreme
Court concurred with the Wisconsin Supreme Court that the rule in question
did not violate appellant’s due process or equal protection rights.89 First, the
Court noted the ethical duty of all attorneys, whether paid or appointed, to
refuse to prosecute a frivolous appeal.90 When paid counsel comes to the
conclusion that the appeal is frivolous, a duty to withdraw arises.91
Although the same duty to withdraw arises when appointed counsel comes
to the conclusion that the appeal is frivolous, appointed counsel must secure
approval of the court to withdraw. Such approval would entail informing
the court of counsel’s opinion about the frivolousness of the appeal.92
Although informing the court of counsel’s opinion would seem to conflict
with counsel’s duty as an advocate, the Court stated, “It is well settled,
however, that this dilemma must be resolved by informing the court of
counsel’s conclusion. . . . We reaffirmed this basic proposition in
83. 486 U.S. 429 (1988).
84. WISC. R. APP. P. 809.32(1) (emphasis added).
85. McCoy, 486 U.S. at 432.
86. Id.
87. Id. at 434 n.6.
88. Id. at 433.
89. Id.
90. Id. at 436.
91. Id. at 437.
92. Id. The Court appears to be working under a misapprehension regarding withdrawal
of paid counsel. For instance, in Florida, no counsel, paid or appointed, may withdraw without
permission of the court. Moreover, paid counsel would also have to recite some reason for
withdrawal. See FLA. R. ADMIN. P. 2.060(i).
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Anders.”93 Further explaining Anders, the Court determined that the
responsibility of counsel was the same, whether appointed or retained:
Every advocate has essentially the same professional responsibility
whether he or she accepted a retainer from a paying client or an
appointment from a court. The appellate lawyer must master the trial
record, thoroughly research the law, and exercise judgment in identifying
the arguments that may be advanced on appeal. In preparing and
evaluating the case, and in advising the client as to the prospects for
success, counsel must consistently serve the client’s interest to the best of
his or her ability. Only after such an evaluation has led counsel to the
conclusion that the appeal is “wholly frivolous” is counsel justified in
making a motion to withdraw.94

In a footnote to the phrase “wholly frivolous,” the Court made its first
attempt to define what it meant by the term:
The terms “wholly frivolous” and “without merit” are often used
interchangeably in the Anders-brief context. Whatever term is used to
describe the conclusion an attorney must reach as to the appeal before
requesting to withdraw and the court must reach before granting the
request, what is required is a determination that the appeal lacks any basis
in law or fact.95

Returning to its original equal protection analysis, the Court noted that
Anders gave to the indigent what the wealthy defendant could afford: a full
examination of the record and identification of arguable issues for appeal.96
The Court specified, however, that an Anders brief was not to be a
substitute for a merits brief:
It is essential to keep in mind that the so-called “Anders brief” is not
expected to serve as a substitute for an advocate’s brief on the merits, for
it would be a strange advocate’s brief that would contain a preface
advising the court that the author of the brief is convinced that his or her
arguments are frivolous and wholly without merit. Rather, the function of
the brief is to enable the court to decide whether the appeal is so frivolous
that the defendant has no federal right to have counsel present his or her
case to the court.97

Addressing the Wisconsin rule itself, the Court found it constitutionally
unobjectionable, given its interpretation by the Wisconsin courts of
requiring no lengthy argument that the appeal is meritless, but merely a
listing of cases, statutes, and facts in the record supporting that
93. McCoy, 486 U.S. at 437 (citation omitted).
94. Id. at 438-39.
95. Id. at 438-39 n.10. This comment appears to be in response to criticisms that the
Anders opinion attempted to draw an impossible distinction between simply “meritless” and
“frivolous” cases. See., e.g., Pengilly, supra note 64; Hermann, supra note 62.
96. McCoy, 486 U.S. at 439.
97. Id. at 439-40 n.13.
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conclusion.98 The Court also commented on the role of appellate courts in
evaluating the briefs:
Unlike the typical advocate’s brief in a criminal appeal, which has as its
sole purpose the persuasion of the court to grant relief to the defendant,
the Anders brief is designed to assure the court that the indigent
defendant’s constitutional rights have not been violated. To satisfy federal
constitutional concerns, an appellate court faces two interrelated tasks as
it rules on counsel’s motion to withdraw. First, it must satisfy itself that
the attorney has provided the client with a diligent and thorough search of
the record for any arguable claim that might support the client’s appeal.
Second, it must determine whether counsel has correctly concluded that
the appeal is frivolous. . . . Just like the references to favorable aspects
of the record required by Anders, the discussion requirement [of reasons
why the appeal is frivolous] may forestall some motions to withdraw and
will assist the court in passing on the soundness of the lawyer’s
conclusion that the appeal is frivolous.99

Concluding, and giving perhaps the most specific direction to the appellate
courts as to their function, the Court stated:
The Anders brief is not a substitute for an advocate’s brief on the merits.
As explained above, it is a device for assuring that the constitutional
rights of indigent defendants are scrupulously honored. The Wisconsin
Rule does no injury to that purpose, nor does it diminish any right a
defendant may have under state law to an appeal on the merits. Once the
court is satisfied both that counsel has been diligent in examining the
record for meritorious issues and that the appeal is frivolous, federal
concerns are satisfied and the case may be disposed of in accordance with
state law. Of course, if the court concludes that there are nonfrivolous
issues to be raised, it must appoint counsel to pursue the appeal and direct
that counsel to prepare an advocate’s brief before deciding the merits.100

Thus, McCoy finally makes clear that the appellate court’s determination
that counsel should be allowed to withdraw carries with it an independent
duty for that court to review the record to determine whether there is any
basis in fact or law to support the appeal. Inferable from that is the appellate
court’s duty to point out issues that might support an appeal when they have
been overlooked by counsel.101

98. Id. at 440.
99. Id. at 442.
100. Id. at 444.
101. In State v. Causey, 503 So. 2d 321 (Fla. 1987), decided the year before McCoy, the
Florida Supreme Court expressly informed appellate courts that their duty under Anders was to
review the record for unraised error. The court specifically rejected the State’s contention that
the appellate court’s only obligation was to assess the merit of the points raised in appointed
counsel’s Anders brief.
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4. Penson v. Ohio: Returning to Sixth Amendment Analysis
In Penson v. Ohio,102 the Court most recently reaffirmed the Anders
briefing procedure and criticized the Ohio Court of Appeals for failing to
follow its dictates.103 Appointed counsel on appeal had filed a “Certification
of Meritless Appeal and Motion.”104 In the certification, counsel informed
the court that he had found no errors requiring reversal and that the appeal
was meritless. He did not advance any issues of arguable merit. Despite his
failure to file a brief in conformance with Anders, the court of appeals
granted the motion to withdraw. The court gave appellant additional time to
file a pro se brief, after which the appellate court planned to review the
record independently to determine whether any error existed requiring
reversal.105 Although no Anders brief and no pro se brief were filed in the
case, the court made its independent review of the record. It found several
arguable claims and decided that plain error had been committed in one
count.106 In reversing appellant’s conviction on that count but affirming the
remaining counts, the court concluded that appellant had “suffered no
prejudice” as a result of his counsel’s failure to address these issues as the
court had thoroughly reviewed the record.107
The Supreme Court granted certiorari to hear the case. In reversing the
decision, it found that the Ohio Court of Appeals’ failure to follow Anders
was error that could not be considered harmless.108 First, the appellate court
erred in not requiring appointed counsel to file a brief in accordance with
Anders.109 The “Certification of Meritless Appeal” was no better than the
no-merit letter sent in Anders and did not assist the court in determining
whether counsel in fact had conducted the extensive examination of the
record constitutionally required of counsel. Moreover, the certification did
not provide the appellate court with any assistance in reviewing the “cold
record” and thus left appellant without an advocate.110 The Court held that
the appellate court also had erred in granting the motion to withdraw before
it had made its own independent review of the record; it noted that,
“[o]bviously, a court cannot determine whether counsel is in fact correct in
concluding that an appeal is frivolous without itself examining the record
for arguable appellate issues.”111
More serious, however, was the appellate court’s determination of issues
that it found arguable without appointing counsel to brief those issues.
102.
103.
104.
105.
106.
107.
108.
109.
110.
111.

488 U.S. 75 (1988).
Id.
Id. at 77.
Id. at 78.
Id. at 79.
Id.
Id. at 81.
Id.
Id. at 82.
Id. at 83 n.10.
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Noting that Anders was a limited exception to the constitutional requirement
of representation on appeal, the Court stated that once an appellate court
finds arguable error, there is no basis for the exception and, as provided in
Douglas, the criminal appellant is entitled to representation.112 The Court of
Appeals’ determination that arguable issues were presented by the record,
therefore, created a constitutional imperative that counsel be appointed.113
The Court concluded that failure to appoint counsel to brief issues of
arguable merit could not be found to be harmless or lacking Strickland
prejudice114 because the appellate court would be reviewing the record
without the assistance of an advocate for the appellant. To hold that this was
harmless error would undercut the very basis of Douglas and Anders and
render their constitutional guarantees meaningless.115 The right to counsel is
fundamental and constitutionally based, and the appellate court’s
determination of the issues without appointment of counsel effectively
denied the appellant that right. Because of this, the Supreme Court reversed
and remanded the case to the Ohio courts for further proceedings.116 Thus,
in Penson, the Court returned to the Sixth Amendment as the underpinning
of the Anders procedure.
In dissent, Chief Justice Rehnquist, conceding the enlargement of the
Sixth Amendment to include the right to effective counsel on appeal, posited
that ineffectiveness claims could be handled as in any other case—as
postconviction matters under the standard of Strickland v. Washington. 117
He suggested that Anders was a “safe-harbor” method for counsel to use to
protect against ineffectiveness claims but that it was Strickland, not Anders,
that created the basic constitutional standard for effective representation.118
Chief Justice Rehnquist’s analysis provides an alternative view of the appellate
court’s review function. An Anders brief may be evaluated as any other brief
in judging the effectiveness of appellate counsel. The appellate court would
not be required to perform an independent review of the record for other
arguable errors. Instead, any deficiencies in counsel’s review of the record
and preparation of the brief would be remediable in collateral proceedings.119
5. Abandonment of Equal Protection?
While the Court’s concerns have shifted among equal protection, due
process, and right of counsel concerns, all three must be satisfied under
Anders and its progeny. First, state review procedures must not be arbitrary
112.
113.
114.
115.
116.
117.
118.
119.

Id. at 84.
Id.
Id. at 85 (citing Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984)).
Id. at 86.
See id. at 89.
Id. at 91 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
Id. at 89 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
Id. at 91.
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with respect to the appeal itself. An indigent defendant must have a fair
opportunity to present appellate claims within the adversary system. Second,
the indigent defendant must not be at a disadvantage when compared to the
nonindigent defendant. Thus, the indigent defendant must be given what the
nonindigent defendant can procure. Third, the indigent defendant must be
represented on an appeal as of right by counsel who performs effectively as an
advocate.
Although premised on the Fourteenth Amendment, Anders, in the final
analysis, is grounded more on ensuring the right to counsel than on either the
equal protection or due process claims. Anders established a procedure to be
followed when counsel desired to withdraw, thus leaving the indigent
defendant with no representation on appeal. The establishment of a right to
counsel on appeal in Douglas would be rendered meaningless if counsel could
withdraw without performing as an advocate. To ascertain that counsel has
indeed given professional representation assuring the indigent defendant the
constitutional right to counsel, the court cannot simply rely on counsel’s bare
conclusion that an appeal is without merit. Thus, the Court has returned to its
starting point in Powell v. Alabama120 in concluding that fundamental fairness
of the criminal prosecution both at trial and on appeal requires that the
defendant have effective assistance of counsel. To ensure that counsel has
been effective, the appellate court must perform an independent review of the
record and look for any points of arguable error before allowing withdrawal
of counsel because the appeal is frivolous.121 This is a function the appellate
court performs for no other class of appellants.
While the Court is vindicating the right to counsel, the procedure it
establishes suffers from serious equal protection implications. If a court
reviews each record and raises arguable error only for an indigent appellant
whose counsel moves to withdraw, then the nonindigent is disadvantaged as
compared to the indigent—a denial of equal protection of the law. Moreover,
it is not only the nonindigent defendant who is disadvantaged. In addition, the
indigent defendant whose counsel raises some meritorious points also is not
entitled to the court’s independent review to raise other arguable points that
counsel may have overlooked. It is a common experience of appellate judges
to discover arguable points that were not raised in the briefs. Indeed, counsel
is consistently encouraged by judges and appellate practice manuals to limit
the points on appeal to those most likely to succeed.
In fact, the Supreme Court has approved as a valid state procedure the
refusal of an appellate court to consider issues not raised in the brief.122 In
Smith v. Murray,123 the Supreme Court had to determine whether the failure to
raise an issue on appeal, which under state procedural rules precluded the
120.
121.
122.
123.

287 U.S. 45 (1932).
See id.
See Smith v. Murray, 477 U.S. 527 (1986).
Id.
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appellate court from addressing the issue, barred the federal court’s attention
to the error in collateral proceedings.124 In that case, the defendant had been
examined prior to trial by a psychiatrist.125 During the trial, the State was able
to elicit, over the defendant’s objection, statements made to the psychiatrist by
the defendant.126 On appeal, counsel did not raise the point regarding the
psychiatrist’s testimony,127 and the state supreme court noted in a footnote that
it addressed only those points raised by the defendant.128 Throughout several
collateral proceedings, the defendant attempted to raise the issue, but each
time the courts held that he was barred by the state procedural rule providing
that failure to raise a claim on direct appeal barred its consideration.129 The
Supreme Court, in approving the result, found that the state courts had an
interest in enforcing a legitimate rule of state procedure.130 If that is a
legitimate rule of appellate procedure and, under Jones v. Barnes, counsel is
not compelled to raise all nonfrivolous issues, then Anders has resulted in a
state procedure that provides disparate treatment to appellants “whose
situations are arguably indistinguishable.”131
IV. STATE COURT RESPONSES TO ANDERS
How state courts have addressed the Anders issue varies widely.132 Ten
states have rejected the Anders procedure. In some states, the public
defenders refuse to file such briefs. A survey of the courts of appeal
following the Anders procedure reveals that the percentage of the criminal
caseload comprised of Anders appeals varies widely—from less than one
percent, to a high of thirty-nine percent, of the total filings. The internal
process each court uses in reviewing an Anders brief also differs markedly.
The survey results show that handling Anders appeals continues to be an
analytical and managerial problem for state appellate courts.
A. States Avoiding the Anders Procedure
Early court decisions that chose not to follow the Anders procedure
primarily addressed the conflict in which appointed counsel is placed in
representing indigent defendants. In 1971, the Missouri Supreme Court
considered the application of Anders to its appellate process in State v.
Gates.133 It focused on the ethical and professional dilemma of the appellate
124.
125.
126.
127.
128.
129.
130.
131.
132.
133.

Id.
Id. at 529-30.
Id. at 530.
Id. at 530-31.
Id. at 531.
Id. at 531-32.
Id. at 534.
Ross v. Moffitt, 417 U.S. 600 (1974).
See generally state court survey responses summarized in appendix.
466 S.W.2d 681 (Mo. 1971).
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lawyer representing the indigent defendant in what appeared to be
conflicting duties to the court and to the client. Quoting from the 1970
tentative draft of ABA Standards: The Prosecution Function and the Defense
Function, the court agreed that counsel does not necessarily violate ethical
standards by briefing issues lacking merit:
On the premise that the lawyer is of greater aid to the court by
remaining with a weak or groundless appeal than by withdrawing, the
preferable position is for him to remain even at some cost to the concept
of professional independence of the lawyer. The lawyer cannot properly
engage in advocacy calculated to mislead or deceive the court . . . [b]ut,
in this situation, appearance of counsel is not an implicit representation to
the court that he believes in the legal substantiality of the contentions
advanced. . . . [T]he procedures in force in many jurisdictions put
defense counsel in the awkward position of arguing against his client and
the reviewing court in the unsatisfactory situation of having to review the
record itself (thus, in effect, considering the merits) in order to determine
whether counsel should be relieved. To avoid such a conflict of interest
and duplication of effort, the Committee recommended that counsel
present to the court whatever there is to present, recognizing that in many
instances this will amount to a presentation of contentions that are not
well founded in any established case law. Counsel thus serves his
function by appearing on behalf of his client and presenting the client’s
arguments. He is not, of course, required to distort the state of the law in
so doing; indeed, he is obligated to reveal to the court any decisions
directly adverse to his client’s contentions, if they have not already been
presented to the court by the government . . . .
This procedure satisfies the principles of Anders and avoids placing
defense counsel in a position in which he may be tempted to take too
narrow a view of the arguments that may be made in his client’s behalf.
At the same time, the lawyer remains consistent to his professional
obligation to be candid with the court in the presentation of the appeal.134

Notably, the problems identified by the ABA Advisory Committee include
the difficult position in which appellate courts are placed in reviewing
Anders briefs. The Missouri Supreme Court adopted the reasoning of the
committee in holding that counsel’s motion to withdraw because the appeal
was frivolous would be denied.135 The Missouri Supreme Court required
counsel to file a brief consistent with the position advanced by the
Committee.136 Colorado137 and Indiana,138 agreeing with Gates, also adopted
the ABA standards for reviewing appeals by indigent defendants.
134. Id. at 683-84 (citations omitted).
135. Id. at 684.
136. Id.
137. McClendon v. People, 481 P.2d 715, 718 (Co. 1971) (en banc). In the opinion, the
court set forth the ABA standards that it adopted for pursuing appeals:
The Special Committee of the American Bar Association, in formulating the
Standards of Criminal Justice relating to Criminal Appeals and to The Prosecution
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Idaho abandoned the Anders procedure in State v. McKenney,139 in
holding that once counsel is appointed on appeal to represent an indigent
defendant, counsel will not be permitted to withdraw on the ground that the
appeal is frivolous or lacks merit.140 Concerned with the prejudice to the
client by the very filing of an Anders motion to withdraw, the court also
observed that in no instance had it allowed withdrawal based on Anders
since that case was decided.141 Thus, because the court did not allow an
Anders withdrawal, counsel who filed a motion to withdraw stating that
there was no merit to the appeal ended up in the untenable situation of then
having to brief the case on the merits.142 Additionally, the court determined
that judicial economy directed that a case with little merit be handled by the
same procedure as any other appeal because the consideration of the Anders
motion merely added a wasted layer of work for both counsel and the
judiciary.143 Finding that Anders set minimal constitutional standards, the
court decided that refusing withdrawal of counsel provided indigent
Function and The Defense Function, gave full recognition to the points raised in
Anders v. California, Supra, and at the same time defined the obligations of defense
counsel in representing a defendant on appeal when the case is without merit. The
Criminal Appeals Standards provide as follows:
3.2 Counsel on appeal
(b) Counsel should not seek to withdraw from a case because of his determination
that the appeal lacks merit.
(i) Counsel should give his client his best professional estimate of the quality of the
case and should endeavor to persuade the client to abandon a wholly frivolous
appeal, or to eliminate particular contentions that are lacking in any substance.
(ii) If the client wishes to proceed, it is better for counsel to present the case, so long
as his advocacy does not involve deception or misleading of the court. After
preparing and filing a brief, on behalf of the client, counsel may appropriately
suggest that the case be submitted on briefs.
(c) Unexplained, general requests by appellants for dismissal of their assigned
counsel should be viewed with disfavor.
Id. (citing ABA STANDARDS , CRIMINAL APPEALS 73-74).
The Standards also provide:
8.3 Counsel on appeal[]
(a) Trial counsel, whether retained or appointed by the court, should conduct the
appeal if the defendant elects to avail himself of that right unless new counsel is
substituted by the defendant or the appropriate court.
(b) Appellate counsel should not seek to withdraw from a case solely on the basis of
his own determination that the appeal lacks merit.
Id. (citing ABA STANDARDS : THE PROSECUTION FUNCTION AND THE DEFENSE
FUNCTION 293).
138. Dixon v. State, 284 N.E.2d 102 (Ind. Ct. App. 1972), overruled on other grounds ,
Music v. State, 489 N.E.2d 949 (Ind. 1986); Hendrixson v. State, 316 N.E.2d 451 (Ind. Ct.
App. 1974).
139. 568 P.2d 1213 (Idaho 1977).
140. Id. at 1214.
141. Id.
142. Id.
143. Id.
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defendants with greater constitutional protection than Anders.144 Consistent
with its determination to treat all indigent appellants alike, insofar as the
procedure for handling appeals is concerned, the court does not search the
record for errors.145 Further, in accord with the general rule across the
country, the Idaho court will not review or raise as error a lower court’s
action which has not been specifically assigned as error in the brief.146
In State v. Lewis,147 the North Dakota Supreme Court determined that
under state law an indigent defendant was entitled to representation
throughout the proceedings, including appeals, as a matter of right, and it
refused to permit counsel to use the Anders procedure.148 In Lewis, appellate
counsel filed an Anders brief raising several issues. In each instance,
however, counsel questioned the merit of the issues and ultimately
concluded that the appeal was frivolous.149 The State responded, not with a
brief on the merits, but by arguing that the appellate court itself was
required to examine the record to determine whether the defendant’s appeal
was frivolous.150 The State contended that it was not required to respond
unless the appellate court found arguable issues.151 The supreme court held
that because the defendant’s appeal was a matter of right, the Anders
procedure would be contrary to North Dakota constitutional and statutory
law, as Anders required the court to examine the proceedings for arguable
merit and to appoint counsel to brief the appeal on the merits only if it found
arguable merit.152 Under North Dakota law, the indigent defendant was
entitled to an advocate throughout the appellate proceedings.153 Instead of the
Anders procedure, the court ordered that when the initially appointed counsel
makes a determination that the appeal is frivolous, the court will then appoint
another attorney to continue appellate representation of the indigent
defendant.154 The court explained that
the appointment of another attorney will provide the indigent defendant
with legal counsel at all stages of his appeal and will eliminate the double
burden of first convincing this court that the appeal has some degree of
merit warranting an attorney’s counsel and later coming back to this court
to convince us that the degree of merit which warranted an attorney’s
counsel also supports a reversal of his conviction.155

144.
145.
146.
147.
148.
149.
150.
151.
152.
153.
154.
155.

Id. at 1215.
See State v. Hoisington, 657 P.2d 17 (Idaho 1983); IDAHO R. APP. P. 35.
See Hoisington, 657 P.2d at 17; IDAHO R. APP. P. 35.
291 N.W.2d 735 (N.D. 1980).
Id. at 737.
Id. at 736.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 737.
Id.
Id. at 738.
Id.
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Conceding the possibility of a case in which an attorney could be compelled to
represent an indigent defendant despite the attorney’s opinion that the appeal
lacked merit, the court maintained that its procedure was superior to Anders
because it saved substantial court time by eliminating the initial screening of
the brief for frivolousness.156 Somewhat inconsistently, and doubtlessly of
concern to appellate lawyers, the court concluded that it could nevertheless
impose sanctions for prosecuting a frivolous appeal.157
In 1981, the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court found that the Anders
procedure not only caused conflicts between appellate counsel and the client
but that it also made the court’s review process more complex.158 In deciding
not to allow motions to withdraw on the ground that the appeal was frivolous,
the court reasoned that this would avoid practical administrative problems.159
It identified such considerations as follows:
If appointed counsel may move to withdraw on grounds of frivolousness,
the court must determine whether the appeal is frivolous in order to rule on
counsel’s motion, and the determination necessarily entails consideration of
the merits of the appeal. As long as counsel must research and prepare an
advocate’s brief, he or she may as well submit it for the purposes of an
ordinary appeal. Even if the appeal is frivolous, less time and energy will
be spent directly reviewing the case on the merits. . . . If the appeal is not
frivolous, but rather arguable on the merits, refusing to permit withdrawal
would also obviate any need to substitute counsel to argue the appeal.160

The court also agreed with Judge Burger in Johnson v. United States161 that
court-appointed counsel performs an important function in bringing to the
court all facts and applicable law, even in a hopeless case.162 Where counsel
finds it “absolutely necessary” on the grounds of professional ethics to
disassociate from purportedly frivolous points raised in the brief, the court
would allow counsel to indicate so in a preface to the brief and would
require that the brief be served on the defendant.163
Expressing the frustration that is experienced by many appellate judges
when confronted with having to review an Anders brief and the entire
record, the Georgia Supreme Court also has refused to allow attorneys to
withdraw on the grounds of frivolousness by filing an Anders brief.164 In
Huguley v. State,165 the court noted that the Anders motion forced the court
156. Id.
157. Id. at 739.
158. Commonwealth v. Moffett, 418 N.E.2d 585 (Mass. 1981).
159. Id. at 590.
160. Id. at 590-91.
161. 360 F.2d 844 (D.C. Cir. 1966).
162. Moffett, 418 N.E.2d at 591 (quoting Johnson, 360 F.2d at 846) (Burger, J., concurring)).
163. Id. at 591-92.
164. See Huguley v. State, 324 S.E.2d 729 (Ga. 1985).
165. Id. The Georgia Court of Appeals adopted Huguley in Fields v. State, 376 S.E.2d 912
(Ga. Ct. App. 1988).
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to act as counsel for the indigent in searching the record for arguable
error—something that it believed appellate counsel is in a far better position
to do.166
The Mississippi Supreme Court’s concern that the Anders motion left
appointed counsel as essentially amicus curiae led that court to abandon
Anders.167 It found that Anders did not satisfy Mississippi’s constitutional
right to effective assistance of counsel because of the conflicting demands
placed upon counsel.168 Therefore, basing its opinion on the Sixth
Amendment right to effective assistance of counsel, the court determined
that a conscientious opinion of counsel that an appeal was without merit was
not good cause to withdraw under the Mississippi rules of court.169
Nevertheless, the court did permit counsel, in a most exceptional case, to
State counsel’s belief that the appeal had no merit.170 If counsel made such a
statement, the court required a copy of that representation to be sent to the
indigent defendant together with a notice that the defendant could file a brief
raising additional points.171 While the Mississippi Supreme Court’s decision
was grounded on constitutional rights, it also expressed a concern for
finality of decisions. The court concluded that it would receive more
collateral attacks on decisions for ineffective assistance of appellate counsel
if counsel were allowed to withdraw because of a representation of an
appeal as frivolous.172
The Oregon courts have made the most thorough examination of Anders
and its progeny in developing a different process of handling no-merit
appeals.173 In State v. Horine,174 the Oregon Court of Appeals considered the
Anders procedures. Finding them wanting, it called them “a disservice to
appellate counsel, appellate courts and criminal appellants.”175 After
addressing the ethical dilemma of an attorney faced with a nonmeritorious
appeal, an issue that has been treated by most courts, the court focused its
attention on the difficulties Anders posed for the courts in their review.176
First, it required the appellate court to review the entire record to determine
whether the appeal was, in fact, frivolous.177 Second, it created an anomaly:
[A]n appellate court must search the record for error when counsel has
found none, although it need not do so when counsel finds and argues
166.
167.
168.
169.
170.
171.
172.
173.
174.
175.
176.
177.

Huguley, 324 S.E.2d at 731.
Killingsworth v. State, 490 So. 2d 849 (Miss. 1986) (en banc).
Id. at 851.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 851-52.
See State v. Horine, 669 P.2d 797 (Or. App. 1983).
Id. at 801.
Id.
Id. at 802-03.
Id. at 803.

648

FLORIDA STATE UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 23:625

one claim of error. As noted by the court in People v. Wende[, 600 P. 2d
1071 (Cal. 1979)], “. . . under this rule counsel may ultimately be able
to secure a more complete review for his client when he cannot find any
arguable issues than when he raises specific issues, for a review of the
entire record is not necessarily required in the latter situation . . . .”178

Arguing that Anders failed to justify the added steps required of the
appellate court, the Oregon court observed that the possibility of counsel’s
failing to raise a nonfrivolous issue exists equally where counsel raises
meritorious claims for reversal and where counsel raises none.179 If
reversible claims are not raised in a non-Anders brief, then the court will
not, “and cannot, search the record in every criminal case to discover
them.”180 If counsel performs ineffectively and fails to raise a point that may
lead to reversal, relief may be obtained through postconviction
ineffectiveness motions.181
What the Oregon court found most troublesome about Anders was that
the procedure it imposed on appellate courts was not constitutionally
required and was possibly constitutionally infirm. Relying substantially on
Ross v. Moffitt,182 the court reasoned that since the State was under no
obligation to provide the criminal defendant with an appeal as of right, the
due process concerns on appeal were not nearly so compelling as those
involved in the initial determination of guilt.183 Because the Fourteenth
Amendment does not require absolute equality but assures only that indigent
defendants have adequate opportunity to present claims fairly in the state’s
appellate process, Anders could not, and should not, compel a more
comprehensive review process for the indigent defendant than for the
nonindigent defendant.184 Thus, by providing the indigent defendant with a
free transcript and competent counsel, the State had provided all that was
required, because that was all that a wealthy defendant could command.185
With that background, the court determined that when counsel filed an
Anders brief and notified the client, who was thereby given the opportunity
to raise whatever issues he or she chose, the court would consider the issues
raised by both counsel and the appellant.186 The court determined that it
would not search the record itself for arguable issues.187
Although Horine’s limitation on the appellate court function under
Anders was never addressed directly by the U.S. Supreme Court, in State v.
178.
179.
180.
181.
182.
183.
184.
185.
186.
187.

Id. (emphasis added).
Id. at 803-04.
Id. at 804.
Id.
417 U.S. 600 (1974).
Horine, 669 P.2d at 804.
Id.
Id. at 805.
Id. at 806.
Id.
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Balfour188 the Oregon Supreme Court concluded that Horine’s procedure
was constitutionally infirm after both McCoy v. Court of Appeals of
Wisconsin189 and Penson v. Ohio.190 The Balfour court detected a shift from
the Fourteenth Amendment concerns set forth in Anders to a Sixth
Amendment concern in McCoy and Penson, and it noted that in Penson the
requirements of Anders were not guidelines but “a stringent benchmark
against which to gauge the state procedures.”191 Nevertheless, the Oregon
Supreme Court maintained that it, and not the U.S. Supreme Court, was the
final arbiter of determinations of ethical practice for attorneys in the state,
except where ethical practices implicated federal constitutional rights.192 It
therefore rejected Anders as the only constitutional solution to the problem
of frivolous appeals by indigent defendants.193
Because the court found that the rules of professional responsibility
precluded an attorney from personally advancing a frivolous claim, it
fashioned a procedure under which counsel could advance only those claims
he or she conscientiously believed were meritorious while still supporting
the client in bringing other arguable issues before the court.194 It reasoned
that an Anders brief was required only when counsel was seeking to
withdraw from representation.195 Therefore, if counsel could not withdraw,
there was no constitutional mandate for the Anders procedure.196 In essence,
counsel would no longer be required to argue issues of questionable
merit.197 Instead, counsel would file a statement as to the facts and
jurisdiction of the court.198 If the client wished to raise issues, counsel
would assist in preparation of, but would not be required to sign, that
portion of the brief and would thus avoid the violation of the ethical
prohibition against advancing issues of no merit.199 By following this
procedure, the court concluded that the attorney would not be ethically
compelled to withdraw from a frivolous case and the client would be
afforded the assistance of counsel for the appeal.200 Moreover, the court
188. 814 P.2d 1069 (Or. 1991).
189. 486 U.S. 429 (1988).
190. 488 U.S. 75 (1988).
191. Balfour, 814 P.2d at 1076.
192. Id. at 1079.
193. Id.
194. Id. at 1080.
195. Id.
196. Id.
197. Id. at 1081.
198. Id.
199. Id.
200. Id. at 1079-80. The holdings of State v. Balfour were incorporated into Rule 5.90,
Oregon Rules of Appellate Procedure :
(1) If counsel appointed by the court to represent an indigent defendant in a criminal
case on direct appeal has thoroughly reviewed the record and discussed the case with
trial counsel and the client, and has determined that there are no meritorious issues
on appeal, counsel shall file a brief with two sections:
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determined that under these procedures, review of the entire record by the
appellate court in the direct appeal would not be required.201 To date,
Balfour has not been challenged in federal court.202
New Hampshire was the most recent state to discard the Anders
procedure in favor of the Idaho rule.203 The New Hampshire Supreme Court
expressed concern for the role of the court under Anders review because the
procedure puts the court in the role of an advocate for the appellant by forcing
it to devise and raise legal arguments and thereby possibly leads to claims of
potential bias on the part of the court. For these reasons, as well as the more
frequently expressed attorney ethical conflict issues, the court adopted the rule
that counsel could not withdraw because of the frivolousness of the appeal.204
However, to accommodate counsel, the court created an exception to its rules
of professional conduct for the rare occasion in which counsel may be
required to assert a frivolous issue on behalf of an indigent criminal client.205
While having no stated rule or opinion rejecting Anders, courts in several
states do not accept Anders briefs. Hawaii has maintained a policy for years of
not accepting Anders briefs and instead urges counsel to raise even extremely
weak points of error in the opening brief.206 Similarly, Kansas has an

(a) Section A of the brief shall contain a statement of the case, including a
statement of facts, sufficient to apprise the court of the jurisdictional basis for the
appeal and shall be signed by counsel.
(b) Section B of the brief shall contain any claim of error requested by the client
and shall be signed by the client. Section B shall attempt to state the claim [and any
argument in support of the claim] as nearly as practicable in the manner that the
client seeks, in proper appellate brief form.
(2) A case in which appellant’s brief is prepared and filed under this rule shall be
submitted without oral argument, unless otherwise ordered by the court.
OR. R. APP. P. 5.90.
201. Balfour, 814 P.2d at 1081.
202. Chief Judge William L. Richardson, Oregon Court of Appeals, notes: “The reality is that
nearly all of the Balfour briefs disclose a lack of any meritorious issues. The briefs, even the
supplemental part filed by the defendant individually, follow a format that is almost a rote
presentation.” Letter from William L. Richardson, Chief Judge, Oregon Court of Appeal, to Martha
C. Warner, Judge, Florida Fourth District Court of Appeal (Jan. 19, 1995) (on file with author).
Nevertheless, based on conferences he has had with various public defender groups, Judge
Richardson expresses confidence in their diligence in performing their responsibilities under Balfour.
Id. He further reports that of 2,654 total criminal filings in 1994, 504, or 18.9%, were Balfour briefs.
Id.
203. State v. Cigic, 639 A.2d 251 (N.H. 1994). In responding to the survey conducted in
connection with this Article, the Clerk of the New Hampshire Supreme Court stated that for
years the public defender of New Hampshire had a policy of not filing Anders briefs. It was
only in 1993 that the appellate defender asked the court whether it would follow Anders or the
“Idaho rule.” Letter from Howard J. Zibel, Clerk of Court, New Hampshire Supreme Court,
to Martha C. Warner, Judge, Florida Fourth District Court of Appeal (June 7, 1994) (on file
with author).
204. Cigic, 639 A.2d at 254.
205. Id.
206. HAWAII APPELLATE HANDBOOK § 8-6 (1988).
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unwritten policy of not accepting Anders briefs.207 In Maryland, when the
Anders dilemma first appeared, the Court of Appeals of Maryland, acting in
concert with the public defender’s office, urged the criminal defense bar not
to file Anders briefs.208 In New Jersey, no Anders briefs are received because
the public defender’s office simply does not file them.209 Similarly, Alaska
reports that the public defender’s office does not file Anders briefs.210
Concluding “that it was better for everyone concerned to simply fully brief
the case and submit it to the court for a decision on the merits,” the Nebraska
Supreme Court abolished its rule allowing counsel to withdraw from frivolous
appeals.211 Moreover, some states report having no, or only sporadic,
Anders briefs filed over the years.212

207. Letter from Mary Beck Briscoe, Chief Judge, Kansas Court of Appeals, to Martha C.
Warner, Judge, Florida Fourth District Court of Appeal (June 1, 1994) (on file with author).
208. Letter from Robert C. Murphy, Chief Judge, Maryland Court of Appeals, to Martha
C. Warner, Judge, Florida Fourth District Court of Appeal (June 9, 1994) (on file with
author).
209. Letter from Judge Herman D. Michels, Presiding Judge for Administration, Superior
Court of New Jersey, Appellate Division, to Martha C. Warner, Judge, Florida Fourth District
Court of Appeal (June 8, 1994) (on file with author).
210. Survey response from Clerk of the Alaska Court of Appeals to Martha C. Warner,
Judge, Florida Fourth District Court of Appeal (Jan. 24, 1995) (on file with author).
211. Letter from William C. Hastings, Chief Justice, Supreme Court of Nebraska, to
Martha C. Warner, Judge, Florida Fourth District Court of Appeal (June 3, 1994) (on file with
author). Chief Judge Richard D. Sievers of the Nebraska Court of Appeals reports that in the
two years since the inception of that court, he recalls only two Anders briefs being filed. He
attributes this in part to the attorneys’ knowledge that Nebraska applies the plain error
doctrine. Thus, attorneys can make arguments and count on the court to address what they
miss. Survey response from Richard D. Sievers, Chief Judge, Nebraska Court of Appeals, to
Martha C. Warner, Judge, Florida Fourth District Court of Appeal (June 3, 1994) (on file with
author).
212. Survey response from Jan Hansen, Clerk, Alaska Court of Appeals, to Martha C.
Warner, Judge, Florida Fourth District Court of Appeal (Jan. 24, 1995); Survey response from
Daniel Wathen, Judge, Maine Supreme Judicial Court, to Martha C. Warner, Judge, Florida
Fourth District Court of Appeal (June 9, 1994); Survey response from Tennessee Court of
Criminal Appeals to Martha C. Warner, Judge, Florida Fourth District Court of Appeal (June
20, 1994) (recalling the filing of only one in the last 15 years); Survey response from Ohio
Eleventh District Court of Appeal to Martha C. Warner, Judge, Florida Fourth District Court
of Appeal; Survey response from Vermont Supreme Court to Martha C. Warner, Judge,
Florida Fourth District Court of Appeal (June 17, 1994); Survey response from Margaret L.
Workman, Justice, West Virginia Supreme Court of Appeals, to Martha C. Warner, Judge,
Florida Fourth District Court of Appeal (June 9, 1994); Survey response from Wyoming
Supreme Court to Martha C. Warner, Judge, Florida Fourth District Court of Appeal (June
14, 1994); Letter from Chief Judge Paul H. Anderson, Minnesota Court of Appeals, to Martha
C. Warner, Judge, Florida Fourth District Court of Appeal (June 15, 1994) (Judge Anderson
indicated that Minnesota does not have Anders briefs because of its centralized public defender
system: “[A]ll convicted felons are provided counsel for appeal, without involvement of the
court in the process of evaluating the merits.”) (all foregoing survey responses and letters on
file with author).
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B. States Following Anders
California reexamined its procedure for addressing no-merit appeals
in People v. Wende. 213 Summarizing the holding of Anders regarding
what procedures were essential to satisfy federal constitutional
standards, the California Supreme Court emphasized that counsel for an
indigent defendant must act in the role of an advocate by filing a brief
referring to anything in the record that would support an appeal.214 After
a copy of the brief is furnished to the client, the court, not counsel,
must examine all of the proceedings to determine whether the appeal is
wholly frivolous.215 Wende addressed whether the appellate court is
required, under Anders, to make a review of the entire record before
determining that the appeal is frivolous.216 It concluded that such a
thorough review is essential:
The thrust of Anders was to increase the protection afforded indigent
appellants. Even the Nash [In re Nash, 393 P.2d 405 (1964)] nomerit letter procedure, which was found inadequate, provided for a
review of the record by the court. This review was deemed
insufficient because it was done without the aid of a brief by counsel
and because the court itself did not make an express finding that the
appeal was frivolous. It is the latter defect which the court appears to
have been attempting to remedy by providing that “the court—not
counsel—then proceeds, after a full examination of all the
proceedings, to decide whether the case is wholly frivolous.” It is no
longer sufficient for a court to review the record to determine the
correctness of counsel’s assessment of the case. . . . The court itself
must expressly determine whether the appeal is wholly frivolous.
Since the court’s concern was with not merely accepting counsel’s
assessment of the case, it follows that the determination and
concomitant review of the entire record must be made regardless of
whether the defendant has availed himself of the opportunity to submit a
brief.217

The court acknowledged that, under the Anders rule, counsel could secure a
more complete review when no arguable issues could be found than when
counsel raised specific issues; however, the court expressed confidence that
attorneys would not shirk professional responsibility obligations by failing
to review a record conscientiously when they know that the court will
undertake such a review.218 Additionally, the court refused to permit counsel
to state on the record that the client’s case was indeed frivolous. Such an
admission would not give the client the services of an advocate but would
213.
214.
215.
216.
217.
218.

600 P.2d 1071 (Cal. 1979) (en banc).
Id. at 1074.
Id.
Id. at 1074-75.
Id. at 1074.
Id. at 1075.
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necessitate counsel’s withdrawal.219 On the other hand, if counsel argued the
points without making such assertions, the court would not need to appoint
new counsel upon finding meritorious issues to address.220 In dissent, Justice
Clark took issue with the majority’s conclusion that Anders required the
appellate court to review the record for errors not raised by counsel.
Anders, he said, “simply commands the appellate court to ascertain whether
appellate counsel and the courts have performed in the manner required by
law. . . . Thus the appellate court shall respond only to issues raised to it,
not to issues raised by it.”221 California has continued to abide by Wende
and conducts a full record review of each Anders brief.222
Several states have adopted rules of court or court orders to formalize
the Anders procedure. Some, such as Arkansas, detail the requirements of
the brief.223 Each state with a rule establishes a procedure for counsel to file
an Anders brief, for the indigent defendant to receive a copy and have time
to respond, and for the court to review the brief.224 Some courts have local
rules or rules of internal operating procedure governing the processing of
Anders motions.225
219. Id.
220. Id. at 1077 (Clark, J., dissenting).
221. Id. (Clark, J., dissenting). Wende was decided ten years before Penson v. Ohio, 488
U.S. 75 (1988), which clearly requires the court to raise issues revealed in its review of the
record.
222. See survey results summarized in appendix.
223. Rule 4-3(j), Rules of the Arkansas Supreme Court and Court of Appeals , requires that
a brief accompanying a request to withdraw on the grounds that the appeal is without merit
shall contain an argument section that consists of a list of all rulings adverse to the
defendant made by the trial court on all objections, motions and requests made by
either party with an explanation as to why each adverse ruling is not a meritorious
ground for reversal. The abstract section of the brief shall contain, in addition to the
other material parts of the record, all rulings adverse to the defendant made by the
trial court.
ARK. R. APP. P. 4-3(j). This type of detail, not required in routine briefs, probably deters the
filing of Anders briefs.
224. DEL. SUP. CT. R. 26(c); IOWA R. APP. P. 104; MICH. Ct. R. 7.211(C)(5); R. OKLA.
CT. CRIM. APP. 3.6(B); State v. Benjamin, 573 So. 2d 528 (La. Ct. App. 1990), approved in
State v. Robinson, 590 So. 2d 1185 (La. 1992) (per curiam); State v. Williams, 406 S.E.2d
357 (S.C. 1991) (order setting forth procedure for processing Anders briefs under the South
Carolina appellate court rules); WISC. R. APP. P. 809.32.
225. In Ohio, the first, second, fourth, sixth, and seventh districts all report having local
procedures to govern the handling of Anders briefs. See appendix. The rest of the districts
responding do not indicate that any formalized procedure has been instituted. The Alabama
Court of Criminal Appeals adopted an internal procedure for handling Anders briefs in April
1992. Several Texas appellate courts have internal rules. See, e.g., Order of the Ninth District
of Texas at Beaumont (Oct. 28, 1993). Other Texas districts have incorporated procedures in
written opinions. See Johnson v. State, 885 S.W.2d 641 (Tex. Ct. App. 1994). The Texas
courts that have set forth briefing requirements generally insist that the briefs include an
analysis of every pretrial motion and every objection made by the defense and overruled by the
court, as well as every objection made by the State and sustained by the court. See, e.g., Order
of the Ninth District of Texas, supra. At least one court noted that defense counsel argue that
because of the detail required in the brief, it is more expeditious to prepare and file a regular
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Of those state courts that receive and review Anders briefs, the incidence
of no-merit briefs varies widely even within a state’s appellate divisions.
For instance, in Florida, the Fourth District Court of Appeal reports that
Anders briefs constitute approximately five percent of its total criminal
filings,226 whereas in the Fifth District Court of Appeal, Anders briefs make
up thirty-four percent of the total criminal filings.227 These differences also
appear in other states.228 The South Carolina Supreme Court reports that
Anders briefs make up thirty-nine percent of its filings, which is the largest
percentage reported of the courts responding to the survey.229 Generally, in
looking at the survey results, appellate courts in urban areas have a higher
incidence of Anders briefs. Thus, it would appear that Anders poses a
greater administrative problem in some states and areas than in others.
Each court follows its own procedures for handling Anders appeals.
When appointed counsel files an Anders brief in the author’s court, the
indigent appellant is first given a chance to file a brief. The case is then
assigned to the central staff, comprised of the most experienced staff
attorneys on the court, to review the record. Next, a memo is prepared
giving a detailed factual statement and an analysis of the points raised by
appointed counsel and by the indigent defendant, if a pro se brief is filed.
The staff memo also discusses any other points that the staff attorney thinks
may raise arguable errors. The assigned judge of a three-judge panel then
reviews the brief, the memo, and as much of the record as the judge deems
necessary to determine whether any arguable issues are present.230 In many
cases in which Anders briefs have been filed, the defendant has pled to the
charge or has been convicted in a relatively short trial and, in an abundance
of caution, the trial attorney has filed a notice of appeal. The issues in such
cases involve either the voluntariness of the plea or the sentence. Typically,
brief. Survey response from Charles Reynold, Chief Justice, Court of Appeals for the Seventh
District of Texas, to Martha C. Warner, Judge, Florida Fourth District Court of Appeal (Jan.
11, 1995) (on file with author). The local rules of Texas are based on the brief requirements
set forth in High v. State, 573 S.W.2d 807, 813 (Tex. Ct. App. 1978).
226. Letter from Marilyn Beuttenmuller, Clerk, Florida Fourth District Court of Appeal,
to Martha C. Warner, Judge, Florida Fourth District Court of Appeal (June 10, 1994) (on file
with author).
227. Survey response from Florida Fifth District Court of Appeal to Martha C. Warner,
Judge, Florida Fourth District Court of Appeal (June 7, 1994) (on file with author).
228. In Texas, the second, seventh, tenth, eleventh, and fourteenth districts report Anders
briefs in 5% or fewer of their criminal cases; the first, eighth, ninth, and thirteenth, between
5-10%; and the sixth and fifth, between 10-15%. On the other hand, Ohio’s twelve districts
are more closely grouped; they report generally from less than 1% to 5% in Anders filings.
Only the second district in Texas reports as great a number as 16% in Anders appeals.
Similarly disproportionate, the First Appellate District of Illinois reports that 31% of the
filings are Anders cases, while the rest of the Illinois appellate courts report that less than 11%
are Anders cases. See appendix.
229. Survey response from South Carolina Supreme Court to Martha C. Warner, Judge,
Florida Fourth District Court of Appeal (June, 6, 1994) (on file with author).
230. The “assigned” judge in the author’s court means the first judge to review the case
and write the opinion, if the judges agree to issue one.
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the record is very limited. Judicial review of the record is not timeconsuming in these types of cases and, because there is no requirement in
Florida that every appellate opinion be written, cases are generally affirmed
without written opinion. In the author’s experience, only in the rarest of
cases is an Anders brief filed after a long trial. Thus, the trial transcripts
and records that the judge is required to read seldom take more than a few
hours. Often the records on sentencing appeals are fewer than thirty pages
and require only a few minutes to read. It is up to the individual judge,
however, to determine how much of the record to read personally and how
much reliance to place on the staff attorney’s review.
After the assigned judge reviews and acts on the appeal, the entire file is
transmitted for similar review by the second and third judges on the panel.
If arguable issues are discovered by either the staff attorney or the judges,
appointed counsel is ordered to brief those issues. Thus, in the author’s
court, review of the case is a combined effort of both staff and judges.
Frequently, staff will find arguable errors not addressed by the public
defender and, sometimes, judges will discern an arguable error not noticed
by either staff or public defender. It is often difficult to resist the temptation
to which the Ohio appellate court succumbed in Penson: to determine, sua
sponte, the arguable issues discovered by the court without further briefing.
In most cases, the court is already of the opinion that the arguable errors
noted probably will not result in a reversal. While the author has never
reviewed a case involving an Anders brief that, after independent review,
resulted in a reversal of a conviction,231 there is such precedent.232
The survey of appellate courts reveals a lack of uniformity in internal
court methods for handling Anders briefs.233 Within the courts answering the
survey, most often a staff attorney or research director reviews Anders
briefs. Many courts rely on their most experienced staff attorneys to review
the records and briefs, while in other courts, the judges’ law clerks review
the cases. Seventy-four percent of the courts surveyed require that their
staff attorneys prepare memoranda for the judges’ review, but within the
appellate divisions of each state, this practice is not consistently followed.234
Not all courts receiving Anders briefs review the record for unraised
points of arguable merit. Fourteen courts, or twenty-one percent of those
responding, indicated that they do not comb the record to point out arguable
231. Minor sentencing errors have been raised and corrected by the court pursuant to
Anders.
232. See, e.g., Causey v. State, 484 So. 2d 1263 (Fla. 1st DCA 1986), wherein the court
reversed the conviction of a defendant after its independent review of the record in
conformance with Anders revealed that the trial court had refused to allow Causey’s counsel to
impeach the State’s main witness on cross-examination. The court certified a question to the
supreme court, which then quashed the opinion because the district court had reversed without
giving either party an opportunity to brief the issue.
233. See generally appendix.
234. See, e.g., appendix (survey responses from the Texas and Ohio courts of appeal).
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appellate issues. Others reported that they point out only issues constituting
clear error, not merely issues of arguable merit.235 When unaddressed issues
are found, the majority of courts simply order rebriefing by appointed
counsel. However, a substantial number of courts order the appointment of
new counsel to file new briefs on this occasion. And, in what appears to be
a practice contrary to the holding of Penson v. Ohio, some courts address
the issues sua sponte without any rebriefing. When issues of arguable merit
are found by the court in its review, whether to appoint new counsel or to
allow rebriefing by withdrawing counsel also varies among the districts
within some states.236
Because Anders involves additional steps of review for the appellate
court, some opinions emphasize that the procedure is too time-consuming
for the court. The survey responses do not indicate that following the
dictates of Anders is generally more time-consuming than the average
criminal appeal. Forty-nine percent of the courts reported that Anders
review takes less time than the average criminal appeal, while forty-four
percent indicated that Anders cases take about the same time to review as
the average criminal case. Only seven percent indicated that their Anders
review takes more time than the average appeal.
V. ALTERNATIVE SOLUTIONS
Some states have incorporated Anders within their appellate review
scheme in unique ways. Connecticut employs its trial court to make the
required Anders review when counsel files an Anders motion to withdraw.237
The motion must be accompanied by a brief addressing anything in the
record arguably supporting an appeal, and an opportunity must be given
for the defendant to file a pro se brief in support of the appeal.238
However, the presiding trial court judge alone makes the independent
review of the record to determine whether the appeal is wholly
frivolous.239 If the judge finds the appeal frivolous and decides not to
appoint new counsel, then the judge must file a memorandum setting forth
the basis for determination.240 The Connecticut Supreme Court may
review the finding of the trial judge upon written motion, but if review is
denied, the appeal is dismissed.241

235. See, e.g., appendix (survey responses from Louisiana Fourth District Court of
Appeal, Nebraska Court of Appeals, North Carolina Court of Appeals, Virginia Court of
Appeals).
236. See, e.g., appendix (survey responses from Ohio and Texas courts of appeal).
237. PRACTICE BOOK §§ 952-956 (Conn. 1994).
238. Id.
239. Id. If the presiding judge is the judge who heard the case, then another judge is
appointed to review the record. Id.
240. Id.
241. Id. § 4053.
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While, at first glance, the Connecticut procedure may appear contrary
to Eskridge v. Washington State Board,242 it, in fact, contains the
safeguards required by Anders—that is, a brief setting forth any arguable
issues and the independent review by a judge for frivolousness. The
Connecticut rule simply delegates to one judge the work that in most
appellate courts is handled by a panel of judges. The rule has not been
challenged, and there is nothing in Anders that compels a full panel of
judges to review the brief. The judicial review required by Anders
amounts to a check on the effectiveness of appellate counsel. There is no
constitutional basis for concluding that the review must be done by more
than one judge.
The State of Washington uses commissioners to determine Anders
motions.243 Counsel files a motion to withdraw, which must “identify the
issues that could be argued if they had merit and, without argument,
include references to the record and citations of authority relevant to the
issues.”244 The State is required to respond by filing either a responsive
brief or a “motion on the merits” arguing to affirm the conviction.245 The
issue for determination by a commissioner may be referred to the motion
docket in one of two ways: 1) pursuant to the State’s motion on the
merits, or 2) where the State has not filed such a motion, on the court’s
own motion.246 Next, the court commissioner examines the motion and
conducts the independent review of the record as required by Anders. If
the commissioner finds arguable error or a failure to comply with the
rules or procedure, then the motion will be denied and briefing will be
required by either the same counsel or new counsel, depending upon the
circumstances.247 On the other hand, if the commissioner finds that the
appeal is frivolous, then an order will be issued granting the motion to
withdraw and affirming the judgment.248
New Mexico has developed perhaps the most novel system for handling
meritless appeals through the use of a summary disposition docket. In 1975,
the procedure was initiated for all criminal cases, and it has since been

242. 357 U.S 214 (1958).
243. Commissioners are lawyers hired by the court to decide motions, screen appeals, and
oversee the training of judicial law clerks. WASH. R. APP. CT. ADMIN. § 16.
244. Id. § 18.3(a)(2).
245. Id. § 18.14(a).
246. Id. § 18.14(d).
247. "If the arguable points are fairly established in the record, then new counsel is
appointed. If the arguable points arise following the filing of the Anders brief, for example
[such as from the absence of a transcript of a portion of the proceedings], then counsel is asked
to re-brief the matter.” Letter from Philip J. Thompson, Chief Judge, State of Washington
Court of Appeals, Division III, to Martha C. Warner, Judge, Florida Fourth District Court of
Appeal (Jan. 11, 1995) (on file with author).
248. WASH. R. APP. CT. ADMIN. § 18.14(h).
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extended to other types of appeals.249 In 1987, all cases filed in the appellate
court were subjected to the summary disposition procedure, which resulted
in sixty to sixty-five percent’s being disposed of summarily.250
Trial counsel must file an appellant’s docketing statement soon after the
notice of appeal.251 It contains: 1) a statement of the case with all relevant
facts, 2) a statement of the issues on appeal and how they were preserved,
and 3) a list of authorities relied upon, together with a parenthetical
description of the proposition for which those authorities are cited.252 The
court then reviews the docketing statement and the record, which includes a
copy of the trial court file.253 Based on that review, it issues a calendar
notice, which is, in essence, the proposed disposition of the case.254 The
parties have ten days in which to file written memoranda as to why the
proposed disposition should, or should not, be made.255 If no memoranda
are filed, then an opinion disposing of the case is filed.256 However, if an
opposition memorandum is filed and found persuasive, the court can either
assign the case to a regular appellate calendar or issue a second opinion
with a different result.257 In that event, both parties have the opportunity to
show cause why the new result should, or should not, prevail.258
With respect to Anders cases, New Mexico’s summary disposition
procedure eliminates the burdensome review of the record because no
transcript is available on summary dispositions in any type of appeal, with
some exceptions.259 Constitutional challenges to the summary disposition
249. Lynn Pickard, New Mexico Summary Disposition Procedure , PARASCOPE , Spring
1987, at 1.
250. Id.
251. Id.
252. N.M. R. APP. P. 12-208. The docketing statement has similarities to the English
notice of appeal.
253. Id.
254. Id.
255. Id.
256. Id.
257. Id.
258. Pickard, supra note 249, at 1. Under this system, although three judges constitute a
quorum for an opinion, one judge is assigned to all calendaring decisions. Id. at 2. This
position rotates every three months. Along with staff attorneys, this judge makes all initial
decisions on the summary calendar. Id. Each case is reviewed by a staff attorney, who makes a
recommendation as to whether the case should be placed on a nonsummary calendar or be
treated under summary disposition procedure. Id. If summary disposition is recommended, the
staff attorney will draft the opinion (calendar notice) for the judge. Id. After memoranda in
opposition are filed, the staff attorney again reviews the opinion and suggests changes. Id. If
the staff attorney recommends no changes and the calendaring judge agrees, then two other
judges are assigned to the case to review and sign the final opinion. Id. at 3. Pickard reports
that the summary disposition procedure requires from 10 to 40 hours of judge and staff time to
complete per case, as opposed to 100 to 140 hours for nonsummary dispositions. Id.
259. See, e.g., State v. Ibarra, 864 P.2d 302, 303-304 (N.M. Ct. App. 1993), cert.
denied, 115 S. Ct. 1116 (1995).
[J]udicial notice of the records of this Court will also show that indigents are allowed
access to the transcripts during the summary calendar process in many situations.
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procedure have been rejected by the New Mexico Court of Appeals.
Because the court frequently denies nonindigent defendants the time
necessary to produce a full transcript of proceedings, the court has rejected
equal protection challenges on the basis that nonindigent and indigent
defendants are treated equally under the procedure.260 The court also has
found no due process violations and has noted that transcripts are not
essential to the disposition of routine cases on appeal.261
Under the unique feature of the summary calendar, the counsel who
tried the case is required to prepare the docketing statement, and each side
is given an opportunity to advance its version of the facts.262 Moreover, if
parties disagree as to the facts so that the court cannot come to a conclusion
without a full transcript, the case is moved to a nonsummary calendar.
Thus, within the context of the state appellate procedures, no criminal
defendant is denied any procedure essential to a fair presentation of the
claim for reversal.263 Finally, in State v. Ibarra, the court made short shrift
of the claim that the New Mexico procedure denied the indigent criminal
appellant effective assistance of counsel by retorting, “Defendant has not
cited one case standing for the proposition that a denial of the constitutional
right to effective assistance of counsel occurs when state court procedures
deny both indigent and nonindigent defendants an absolute right to pick
through a transcript searching for unidentified error.”264
A similar solution for the handling of Anders meritless appeals would
require the limited filing of statements of points on appeal.265 However, this
solution would require the filing of the transcript to enable the staff of the
appellate court to make an independent review of the record.266 Professors
Carrington, Meador, and Rosenberg contend that the problem is not only
the assertion of frivolous issues on appeal but the excessive briefing that

This happens in judicial districts which routinely duplicate the audio tapes or produce
computer-assisted transcripts in sufficient time to allow their use at this stage. When
necessary, this Court has requested the tape monitor or court reporter to specifically
make such records available during the calendaring process. Such express allowance
by this Court usually turns on an allegation of a good-faith inability to recall some
matter related to the issues raised on appeal. As a general rule, the only time the
Court does not allow access to the transcript is when significant extra time is
requested and the sole allegation is that it is necessary to sort through the transcript
for unidentified error.
Id. See also State v. Sheldon, 791 P.2d 479, 480 (N.M. Ct. App.), cert. denied, 498 U.S. 969
(1990) (“It has long been recognized by this court that the appellate rules do not allow
appellate counsel to pick through the record for possible error.”).
260. See, e.g., Ibarra, 864 P.2d at 303.
261. Id.
262. Id. at 305.
263. Id.
264. Id. at 306.
265. CARRINGTON ET AL ., JUSTICE ON APPEAL 85 (1976).
266. Id.

660

FLORIDA STATE UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 23:625

taxes the time and effort of the court and its staff.267 The professors assert
that this time could be more profitably spent on meritorious cases.268 They,
therefore, propose limits on the extensiveness of argumentation on
nonmeritorious issues. Their system would require counsel to file a
statement of issues when the appeal is filed, or shortly thereafter; the
statement would include a capsulized argument of each issue with two or
three citations of authority.269 No more than two or three pages would be
allowed. The State would file a similarly constructed brief response.270
Taking these statements and the transcript, the staff attorney at the appellate
court would review the transcript and the issues raised and make a
recommendation with regard to any issues that required further briefing.271
The recommendation would be furnished to counsel, who then would brief
only those issues.272 This procedure would reduce the briefing process for
all criminal appeals, as well as the time spent by counsel and the court on
issues not requiring full briefing.273
Under both the New Mexico procedure and the similar
Carrington/Meador/Rosenberg solution, all criminal appeals, not merely
Anders motion cases, would first pass through the summary procedure. In
this way, appeals of nonindigent and indigent defendants would be treated
equally and the procedure would thereby satisfy the major concern
expressed by the U.S. Supreme Court in Anders. However, if the Anders
standard is to be followed, in order to satisfy equal protection concerns,
court staff attorneys would be required to raise any points of arguable merit
noted in non-Anders cases, as well as in Anders meritless cases. This would
tend to increase the burden on the appellate courts, which do not address
unraised errors in typical criminal appeals.
The U.S. Army Court of Criminal Appeals, which serves as the
appellate court in military court martial cases, uses another method to avoid
the Anders dilemma.274 Under this procedure, every conviction by a military
court is automatically reviewed by the appellate court. The court must
review the entire record for errors of law and fact, whether or not assigned
as error and argued on appeal.275 Moreover, counsel on appeal must invite
the court’s attention to any issues that the appellant wants raised, regardless
of whether counsel considers them frivolous. However, counsel is not
required to brief frivolous issues. Nevertheless, the court must consider
those issues and must acknowledge in its opinion that they have been
267.
268.
269.
270.
271.
272.
273.
274.
275.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 89.
Id. at 90.
10 U.S.C. § 866(c) (1988).
Id.; United States v. Grostefon, 12 M.J. 431 (C.M.A. 1982).
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considered.276 The court reports that approximately 1,200 cases were filed
there last year. Of those, approximately sixty percent were Anders-type
appeals.277
Such a system of reviewing all criminal convictions and sentences would
be entirely impractical in states where trial courts handle a large number of
criminal cases. For instance, in Florida’s Broward County (which
encompasses Fort Lauderdale), 14,598 criminal cases were disposed of in
1993,278 although only 2,009 appeals were filed from those dispositions.279
For the Fourth District Court of Appeal to review another 8,000 to 10,000
cases would nearly triple the size of the court’s caseload. That would not
include the corresponding increases from the five other counties over which
it has appellate jurisdiction. The automatic review of convictions would
greatly increase the workload of the appellate court and, therefore, its
funding requirements. However, most state legislatures historically
underfund appellate courts and, thus, that solution appears impractical.280
276. Grostefon, 12 M.J. at 435.
Appellate defense counsel has the obligation to assign all arguable issues, but he is
not required to raise issues that, in his professional opinion, are frivolous. But he is,
after all, an advocate, and if he errs, it should be on the side of raising the issues.
There can be little harm in this practice since the Court of Military Review has the
mandatory responsibility to read the entire record and independently arrive at a
decision that the findings and sentence are correct in law and fact. Hence raising an
issue that counsel does not think is meritorious would, at worst, signal the Court of
Military Review to consider the record in light of that issue. If the accused urges an
issue which appellate counsel believes would be counter effective to the accused’s
case, they should so inform the accused and seek to have him withdraw it. If he
refuses, they may still ethically list the issue for consideration of the appellate court
without further briefing.
Id. (citation omitted).
277. Survey response from William S. Fulton, Jr., Judicial Advisor, U.S. Army Court of
Criminal Appeals (formerly named Army Court of Military Review), Court of Military
Review, Falls Church, Virginia, to Martha C. Warner, Judge, Florida Fourth District Court of
Appeal (June 14, 1994) (on file with author).
278. Circuit Court Criminal Dispositions, Office of the State Courts Administrator (Jan.
12, 1995). This figure comprises all types of dispositions, including dismissals. Therefore, the
number of dispositions that might generate a right to appeal would be smaller than the number
reported.
279. REPORT ON FILINGS FROM THE FOURTH DISTRICT COURT OF APPEAL, STATE OF
FLORIDA (on file with author).
280. In Justice on Appeal, Professors Carrington, Meador, and Rosenberg present a variation
on the Court of Military Criminal Appeals procedure. They propose the creation of a nonjudicial
Criminal Review Office, which would undertake routine administrative review of all criminal
convictions in which no appeal is taken. See CARRINGTON ET AL ., supra note 265, at 94-96. It
would have the authority to identify errors of substance that should be addressed by the appellate
court and would have the authority to certify those issues to the court even though an appeal has
not been taken. Id. In order to encourage indigent appellants to refrain from appealing where their
appeals lack substantial merit, the authors argue that indigent appellants should be required to
undertake the same cost/benefit analysis that the nonindigent appellant makes. Id. That is, the
indigent should be required to weigh the likelihood of success on appeal against the expenditure of
funds on a transcript and a lawyer to pursue the appeal. Under this system, the indigent would be paid
a certain amount of money if the appeal were foregone. However, if he took the money, then no
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VI. CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS
The vexatiousness of Anders meritless appeals reflects the conflicting
pressures on the state appellate courts. On one hand, courts with rising
caseloads need to spend their collective time determining cases that have
merit. On the other hand, the appellate process must be fair to each
individual defendant. If the ultimate fairness of the proceeding is
determined by the effectiveness of counsel in representing the defendant,
then the goal should be to compel full representation through appeal and not
to allow ways for that representation to be avoided. Thus, those states that
refuse to allow withdrawal of counsel on the ground that the appeal is
frivolous more effectively provide the right than do those that allow counsel
to withdraw.
Moreover, what is particularly disturbing to most judges who have
reviewed Anders appeals is the inconsistency of the appellate system created
by Anders. An indigent defendant whose appointed counsel states that there
are no arguable issues to raise is entitled to the full and independent review
of the court to discern whether the attorney has missed points of arguable
error. However, neither the indigent defendant whose attorney does not file
an Anders brief nor the nonindigent defendant gets this kind of review from
the court.
Illustratively, the author was presented with two appeals recently. In
one, the indigent defendant had been convicted of murder. The record
consisted of a lengthy transcript, but in the brief on appeal, the only issue
raised by the public defender was whether the trial court had erred in
ordering restitution to the victim’s family. However, the public defender did
not file an Anders brief, and thus the duty to review the record
independently was not triggered. Contending that his appointed counsel
failed to represent him adequately, the indigent defendant filed a motion to
represent himself on appeal. In the other case, the indigent defendant had
been convicted after a lengthy trial and sentenced as a habitual offender.
The full transcript was sent as part of the record, but the only issue raised
by the appointed appellate counsel involved whether the trial court had
erred in imposing the habitual offender sentence. No issues were raised as
appeal or collateral matter could be pursued at public expense, although the authors would allow the
indigent defendant to pursue either the appeal or collateral matters at his own expense. Id.
Furthermore, the indigent would know that his case would be reviewed by the Criminal Review
Office, which could certify issues to the appellate court if it found that a substantial error had been
committed. Id.
It is hard to justify what would be a substantial expense to the government not only to
provide what the authors acknowledge would be politically unpopular payments to indigent
defendants but also to set up an office of criminal review. In addition, when this suggestion
was made in 1976, pro se litigation by criminal defendants was uncommon, whereas today pro
se litigants are numerous and persistent. Indeed, they pose, in this author’s view, a more
significant depletion of appellate court time on issues involving no merit than do Anders
litigants.
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to the conviction. Again, no duty of the appellate court to make an
independent review of the record was activated because the attorney did not
rely on Anders.281
Of course, the appellate court could always strike the briefs in cases such
as these and order the attorneys to file Anders briefs as to the convictions.
However, this would be at the discretion of the panel reviewing the case.
More than the burden placed on the appellate court to review the full
record, the real problem with Anders is that it creates two distinct classes of
appellate review for criminal defendants and results in a failure of equal
protection.
One continual source of Anders withdrawal motions is in appeals from
sentences after pleas of guilty or nolo contendere. Even though the
defendant may have entered into a plea agreement, an appeal is filed and a
full brief is required. Neither Anders nor any of the other Supreme Court
cases discussing Anders involved an appeal solely from a sentence or a plea.
Thus, the procedure developed does not seem to be the best way to cope
with these types of appeals. A better solution would be to make review of
pleas and sentences discretionary through the use of the petition for writ of
certiorari; procedures similar to those used in New Mexico could be
employed. Trial counsel would be responsible for filing the petition setting
forth the charges, the plea, the sentence, and the issues entitling the
petitioner to review, together with citations of authority. A copy of the
transcript of the plea colloquy and a sentencing scoresheet, if used in the
state, would accompany the petition. The court would review the petition
and determine whether it stated a case for relief to which the State should
respond. If it did not, the petition would be dismissed, ending sentencing
review. Review in this manner would be less time-consuming for both
counsel and the court, without sacrificing the individualized consideration of
each defendant’s case. It also would apply to both nonindigent and indigent
defendants and thus avoid equal protection problems.
In most cases, it is not ethically necessary for counsel to withdraw since
the issues, while not supporting reversal, are not frivolous. Busy appellate
public defenders often do not fully appreciate what an entirely frivolous
appeal is. McCoy attempted to define it as an appeal that lacks any basis in
fact or in law. That does not satisfactorily explain to appellate counsel that
appeals which they conclude are not “winners” still may not be frivolous.
Both appointed counsel and court staff sometimes refer to the absence of
281. The Florida Supreme Court has determined that where only minor sentencing issues
are raised, the Anders review process still applies. In re Appellate Court Response to Anders
Briefs, 581 So. 2d 149 (Fla. 1987). Failure to follow the habitual offender statute would most
likely not be considered a minor issue, except that in the above case, our court had already
decided the identical issue against the position of the appellant. In the brief on appeal, the
appointed attorney merely asked for our court to certify the question to the supreme court for
review. As to the former case, whether restitution was proper may be a minor issue when the
appellant has been sentenced to life in prison.
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reversible error, rather than to the absence of arguable error. Indeed, many
issues raised in an Anders brief are arguable even though they will not
support reversal.
Definitions of a frivolous appeal vary from state to state. For instance,
the Washington courts define a frivolous appeal as one that presents “no
debatable issues upon which reasonable minds might differ . . . and . . . so
totally devoid of merit that there [is] no reasonable possibility of
reversal.”282 In Florida, a frivolous appeal is comprehensively defined as
follows:
A frivolous appeal is not merely one that is likely to be unsuccessful. It is
one that is so readily recognizable as devoid of merit on the face of the
record that there is little, if any, prospect whatsoever that it can ever
succeed. . . . It must be one so clearly untenable, or the insufficiency of
which is so manifest on a bare inspection of the record and assignments
of error, that its character may be determined without argument or
research. An appeal is not frivolous where a substantial justiciable
question can be spelled out of it, or from any part of it, even though such
question is unlikely to be decided other than as the lower court decided it,
i.e., against appellant or plaintiff in error.283

If proceedings are viewed with this definition in mind, few appeals will be
so devoid of any arguable matter that an Anders brief would be justified.
Adherence to a high standard of frivolousness would significantly reduce
Anders filings.
What American courts refer to as frivolous appeals are termed
“hopeless” appeals in England.284 Under the English system, a single judge
reviews an application for leave to appeal.285 Leave is granted where
arguable points of substance appear. To deter applications for appeal in
frivolous cases, the reviewing judge who denies leave to appeal on the
grounds that the appeal is hopeless can order that time already spent in
custody will not be credited toward the appellant’s sentence. Thus, in
England, the appellant has something to lose by pursuing a hopeless
appeal.286 A comparable penalty in state jurisdictions would be a statutory
authorization for the denial of prison “gain time”287 in a case involving an

282. State v. Rolax, 702 P.2d 1185, 1189 (Wash. 1985) (quoting Millers Cas. Ins. Co. v.
Briggs, 665 P.2d 887, 891 (Wash. 1983)). Similarly, Massachusetts has defined a frivolous
appeal as one that “not merely lack[s] merit, but would not have a prayer of a chance.” Pires
v. Commonwealth, 370 N.E.2d 1365, 1371 (Mass. 1977).
283. Treat v. State ex rel. Mitton, 163 So. 883, 883-84 (Fla. 1935).
284. See MEADOR ET AL ., APPELLATE COURTS: STRUCTURE , FUNCTION , PROCESSES &
PERSONNEL 791 (1994).
285. Id.
286. Id.
287. “Gain time” is a deduction from a sentence to reward appropriate behavior on the
part of the prisoner. See, e.g., FLA. STAT. § 944.275 (1995).
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appeal deemed frivolous by the court. The penalty would apply both to
indigent and nonindigent appellants.
A change in the rules of professional conduct as well as the adoption of
the ABA Standards for Criminal Appeals would facilitate both the
protection of the Sixth Amendment right to counsel and the smooth
functioning of the appellate court. The standards provide that if a client in a
frivolous case demands to proceed with an appeal, “it is better for counsel
to present the case, so long as his advocacy does not involve deception or
misleading of the court.”288 It should be made clear in the rules of conduct
that counsel appointed to represent an indigent defendant in a criminal
appeal will not violate the code of professional conduct by filing a brief,
despite its lack of merit, so long as counsel does not misrepresent facts or
law. The appellate court is better served when it receives a full brief in the
case rather than an Anders brief requiring the judge to conduct an
independent review of the record for points of arguable merit. Under the
current Anders procedure, there is no penalty to the appointed counsel for a
less-than-full examination of the record. More Anders briefs are filed when
caseloads of public defenders increase, and, invariably at these times, the
court’s review reveals issues of arguable error not pointed out by counsel. If
nothing else, under current Anders procedure, the failure to raise issues of
arguable error should involve as great of a penalty to counsel as the filing of
a frivolous brief. In the long run, both tax the resources of the court.
If counsel is precluded from withdrawing when an appeal is frivolous, in
those instances in which a complete review of the record reveals nothing
that counsel can raise, counsel can still fulfill the duty of advocacy for the
client without compelling the appellate court to search the record for
arguable error. Stricter adherence to the rules of appellate procedure in the
preparation of the brief would assist the court.289 First, counsel’s brief
should set forth everything that is required in the appellate rules of most
states, namely, statements of the nature of the case, the course of
proceedings, and the facts with appropriate references to the record.
Second, the issues or argument section should contain whatever the attorney
can present to the court without deception or misstatement of law. Thus,
counsel could argue points and leave to the appellate court the question of
whether or not the error is harmless. Third, the State would be required to
respond to the brief, as it would in any other appeal. These procedures
would apply to all criminal appeals, not just to appeals by indigent
defendants. Consequently, all criminal appeals would be treated alike and
equal protection problems would be avoided.
Appellate court review would proceed as with any other appeal. The
court, however, would more liberally exercise its authority to strike a brief
288. See McClendon v. People, 481 P.2d 715 (Co. 1971) (en banc).
289. See, e.g., FLA. R. APP. P. 9.210(b)(3).
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that does not adhere to the rules of appellate procedure. This is especially
relevant to presentation of a complete statement of the case and facts. By
insisting on a full presentation of the facts and procedure, the court can
assure that each appellant has had the opportunity of representation by
counsel who has reviewed the record on appeal. Whether or not counsel’s
representation is effective in presenting meritorious points for review is
governed by Strickland v. Washington,290 as Justice Rehnquist explained in
his dissent in Penson v. Ohio.291 If counsel, by failing to raise issues that
could lead to reversal, does not provide effective assistance in the brief, the
indigent defendant would still have the same right as other criminal
defendants to secure relief pursuant to a postconviction claim for
ineffectiveness of counsel.
In addition to counsel’s ethical obligation to represent the client to the
fullest extent of the law, the threat of an ineffectiveness of counsel claim
can be expected to spur appellate counsel to review the record thoroughly
and to raise meritorious issues. No attorney wants to be upbraided by a
court for failing to raise a claim that could have resulted in the reversal of a
defendant’s conviction. Moreover, with their access to prison law libraries
and trained paralegals to assist in the preparation of legal briefs, many
convicted defendants are more than ready to review their own records and
point out their counsel’s ineffectiveness. Postconviction relief
ineffectiveness claims, available to all defendants, assure that defendants
receive their Sixth Amendment right of effective assistance of counsel.
Importantly, these claims do so without affording the indigent defendant
appellate review unavailable to the nonindigent defendant.
By refusing to allow counsel to withdraw, appellate courts are better
served because they will receive a brief on the merits, regardless of the
issues. The review process will be the same for all similarly situated
defendants, and all defendants will thus receive the full extent of the Sixth
Amendment guarantee of right to counsel. Moreover, in the hierarchy of
rights and obligations under our Constitution, the preservation of the right
to counsel must have a higher priority than the nonconstitutionally based
ethical dilemma that may arise occasionally for the attorney who finds no
arguable error in an appeal.
The prohibition of withdrawal of counsel and the modification of
appellate procedures and disciplinary rules cannot be established by the
U.S. Supreme Court. The individual states have control over the practice of
law within their borders. Any change in the right to appeal, the rules of
appellate procedure, or the ethical rules of the bar must come from the
states, not the Supreme Court. Of those states that have modified or rejected
the Anders procedure, none have been overturned by the federal courts.
290. 466 U.S. 668 (1984).
291. 488 U.S. 75, 89 (1988) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
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Thus, it appears that providing for the right of counsel to indigent
defendants without denying equal protection to other defendants can occur
without burdening the courts with the cumbersome Anders procedure. It
would be a great benefit to the institution of the appellate courts of the states
to undertake that endeavor.

668

FLORIDA STATE UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 23:625

APPENDIX: SURVEY OF COURT PROCEDURES FOR HANDLING ANDERS
NO-MERIT CRIMINAL APPEALS
Preface
The appendix consists of a table summarizing the responses to a
questionnaire requesting information on state appellate court procedures
for handling Anders cases; the questionnaire was sent to all state appellate
courts. Not all of the questions asked in the survey are included in the
table. The answers to these questions are either contained in the Article
itself or did not produce useful information.
Most of the courts provided 1993 data, although some courts that
answered a second request provided 1994 data. The statistics presented in
the table regarding the number of criminal cases filed and the number of
Anders briefs filed are, in most instances, estimates. The asterisk (*)
indicates that the survey response provided an estimate. The precision of
the numbers was not so important to the author as the overall trend.
Therefore, the figures provide only a general guide.
Many times a court provided additional clarifying comments. The
footnotes appended to the table provide the reader this additional
information.
Some courts did not answer all questions. In other cases, the author
had to make decisions as to how to interpret the data and conform the
answers to the chart choices. For instance, many courts noted that the
court itself did not appoint new counsel when arguable points were
discovered. Instead, the court remanded the case to the trial court to make
the appointment. The author elected to treat such answers as appointing
new counsel. The mechanics of the appointment were not of concern for
the purposes of this survey.
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STATE
Court
No. of Judges on Court
NO. OF CRIMINAL CASES PER YEAR
No. of Anders appeals
Anders cases as a % of total
STAFF USED TO REVIEW CASE
1) Judge's personal law clerks
2) Most experienced staff atty
3) Least experienced staff atty
4) Other

AL
Ct. Crim.
App.
5

AK
App.
Ct.
3

AZ
App./
Div. I
15

AZ
App./
Div. II
6

S. Ct.
7

AR
App.
Ct.
6

2260
63
2.79

4-500
0
0

1900
*350
15.7

800
*150
18.75

265
14
5.28

300
40
13.33

yes

yes

yes

WHO REVIEWS TRANSCRIPT
1) Law clerk or staff atty
2) Judge
3) Both
4) Other
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AR

yes

always
generall
y

yes

yes

generally

yes

yes
yes

usually

no

yes

yes

RAISE ARGUABLE POINTS ITSELF

yes

no

yes292

yes

IF IT FINDS UNRAISED ARGUABLE
POINTS, DOES COURT
1) Order new brief
2) Appoint new counsel
3) Determine issues sua sponte

yes

yes

yes

yes
sometimes

yes

IN ANDERS CASE, DOES COURT
1) Conference case
2) Circulate w/o conference

yes

yes

yes

yes

yes

IS A WRITTEN OPINION REQUIRED

no

yes

yes

no

no

IS STAFF MEMO PREPARED
DOES COURT COMB RECORD AND

IS TIME DEVOTED TO ANDERS CASE
1) More than the average case
2) About the same as average
3) Less than average

xxx
xxx
xxx

xxx

xxx

292. Arizona Court of Appeal, Second Division. By statute, the court must review the
record for fundamental error in all criminal appeals. See State v. Styers, 865 P.2d 765, 774
(Ariz. 1993) (citing ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 13-4035 (1993)). But see 1995 Ariz. Sess.
Laws ch. 198, § 1 (repealing § 13-4035 after the survey responses were returned).
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CA
App.
Dist. I
19

CA
App.
Dist. II
26

CA
App. Dist.
III
10

CA
App.
Dist. IV
18

CA
App.
Dist. V
9

CA
App.
Dist. VI
6

1486
258
17.6

2310
508
21.99

1050
*120
11.42

1400
180
12.85

830
*125
15

534
76
14.28

STAFF USED TO REVIEW CASE
yes293

1) Judge's personal law clerks
2) Most experienced staff atty
3) Least experienced staff atty
4) Other
WHO REVIEWS TRANSCRIPT
1) Law clerk or staff atty
2) Judge
3) Both

yes
varies294 varies295 cent. staff296 varies297
yes

yes
sometimes
yes

yes

yes
yes

varies298

4) Other
IS STAFF MEMO PREPARED

yes

yes

no

yes

DOES COURT COMB RECORD AND
RAISE ARGUABLE POINTS ITSELF

yes

yes

yes

yes

yes

yes

yes

yes

yes

yes

yes
rarely

yes

2) Circulate w/o conference

yes

yes299

yes

yes

yes

IS A WRITTEN OPINION REQUIRED

yes

yes

yes

yes

yes

yes

IS TIME DEVOTED TO ANDERS CASE
1) More than the average case
2) About the same as average
3) Less than average

xxx

xxx

xxx

xxx

xxx

xxx

IF IT FINDS UNRAISED ARGUABLE
POINTS, DOES COURT
1) Order new brief
2) Appoint new counsel
3) Determine issues sua sponte
IN ANDERS CASE, DOES COURT
1) Conference case

sometimes sometimes

yes

293. California Sixth Appellate District. Either the law clerk or the judge reviews the case
and reads the transcript.
294. California, First Appellate District. Personnel review the case; the type of personnel
used varies with each division of the court.
295. California, Second Appellate District. Personnel review the case; the type of
personnel varies with each division of the court.
296. California Third Appellate District. The court’s central staff, which includes attorneys
of all levels of experience, review the case.
297. California Fourth Appellate District. Within some divisions, the most experienced
staff review the case, while in others staff of average experience review the case.
298. California Second Appellate District. Several divisions of the court report that both judge and
clerk review the transcript and record. One division reports that the staff attorney reviews the record.
299. California Second Appellate District. One division reports that it conferences the
case. The remaining divisions that responded report that they circulate the case.
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Ct.
16

CT
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Ct.
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*700

214
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S. Ct.
5
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App.
9
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1200
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*10
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1) Judge's personal law clerks
2) Most experienced staff atty
3) Least experienced staff atty
4) Other
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DOES COURT COMB RECORD AND
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IF IT FINDS UNRAISED ARGUABLE
POINTS, DOES COURT
1) Order new brief
2) Appoint new counsel
3) Determine issues sua sponte
IN ANDERS CASE, DOES COURT
1) Conference case
2) Circulate w/o conference
IS A WRITTEN OPINION REQUIRED

*2-300 *300
12302

25

yes

judge
yes

yes
judge

yes

yes

generall
y

yes

yes

yes

no

yes

yes

yes

yes

yes

yes

yes

yes

yes

yes

varies

yes

yes

yes

no

304

yes
no

no

no

IS TIME DEVOTED TO ANDERS CASE

300. Colorado adopted the ABA standards for reviewing indigent appeals in 1971;
however, it still reviews one or two a year. The unified appellate division of the State Public
Defender’s Office believes that Anders briefs require more work and slow the appellate
process.
301. Connecticut Appellate Court. The trial court determines whether the case is frivolous and
whether compliance with Anders has occurred. Thus, the appellate court keeps no statistics on such
cases.
302. Florida Second District Court of Appeal. The court reported that Anders briefs were filed in
several hundred cases. The author assigned 200-300 as a number to come to a rough percentage for the
court.
303. Florida First District Court of Appeal. The senior career staff attorney screens the Anders
brief to determine whether it complies with the Anders requirements, e.g., whether there is an
adequate discussion of the facts and any potential issues. If it does comply and the senior attorney
believes the appeal has no merit, the case is flagged for a summary affirmance. An order is then
issued allowing the appellant to file a pro se brief. When the brief is filed, or time for responding
expires, the file is sent to another staff attorney. If the case is not flagged for summary affirmance, it
is treated and reviewed as any other case, while taking into account the requirements of Anders.
304. Delaware Supreme Court. Cases are decided by opinion or order. Anders cases are normally
decided by order.
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87
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1237
423
34.19
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yes

yes305

yes
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yes
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1) Conference case
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yes

yes

IS A WRITTEN OPINION REQUIRED

no

no
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xxx

STATE
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No. of Anders appeals
Anders cases as a % of total
STAFF USED TO REVIEW CASE
1) Judge's personal law clerks
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3) Least experienced staff atty
4) Other

xxx
xxx

GA

GA

S. Ct.
7

App. Ct.
9

xxx
HI
S.
Ct.
5

HI
App.
Ct.
4

does not does not 340
allow
allow
0
withdrawal withdrawal

200
0

ID
S. Ct.
does not
allow
withdrawal

WHO REVIEWS TRANSCRIPT
1) Law clerk or staff atty
2) Judge
3) Both
4) Other

IF IT FINDS UNRAISED ARGUABLE
POINTS, DOES COURT
1) Order new brief
2) Appoint new counsel
3) Determine issues sua sponte

IS TIME DEVOTED TO ANDERS CASE
1) More than the average case
2) About the same as average
3) Less than average

305. Florida Fourth District Court of Appeal. The staff reviews the record. Review by the
judge is within each judge's discretion.
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IL
App.
Dist. I
24

IL
App.
Dist. II
9

IL
App.
Dist. III
6

IL
IL
App. Dist. App. Dist.
IV
V
6
7

2257

595

500

502

315

700
31

31
5.2

*55
11

23
4.58

11306
3.4

yes
yes

yes
yes

yes

research dir.

research dir.

yes

yes
yes

yes

yes

IS STAFF MEMO PREPARED

no

yes

no

not always

yes

DOES COURT COMB RECORD AND
RAISE ARGUABLE POINTS ITSELF

yes

yes

no

no

yes

yes

yes

yes

yes

sometimes
occasionally
sometimes

yes

yes

yes

yes

yes

no

yes

yes

IF IT FINDS UNRAISED ARGUABLE
POINTS, DOES COURT
1) Order new brief
2) Appoint new counsel
3) Determine issues sua sponte
IN ANDERS CASE, DOES COURT
1) Conference case
2) Circulate w/o conference
IS A WRITTEN OPINION REQUIRED

no

IS TIME DEVOTED TO ANDERS CASE
1) More than the average case
2) About the same as average
3) Less than average

xxx

no

307

xxx
xxx

xxx

xxx

306. Illinois Fifth Appellate District. The information supplied by the staff indicates a wide
fluctuation in Anders briefs from year to year. For instance, in 1990, 13 Anders briefs were filed,
while in 1991 and 1992, 29 and 28 were filed respectively. The figures in the chart are from
1993. The court reports that in 1994, 361 criminal appeals were filed, 32 of which were Anders
cases, or almost 9%.
307. Illinois Second Appellate District. A written opinion, concise order, or summary order is
required in each case. Even summary orders require a limited discussion of the facts and the
contentions raised. This explains the discrepancy among the answers from the various courts of
Illinois. The question on the survey asked only whether the court was required by law to write
opinions in each case. While not all cases require opinions, a written decision is mandated.
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STATE
Court

IN

IN

IA

IA

S. Ct.

App. Ct.
15

S. Ct.
9

App. Ct.
6

does not

does not

610

No. of Judges on Court
NO. OF CRIMINAL CASES PER YEAR
No. of Anders appeals
Anders cases as a % of total
STAFF USED TO REVIEW CASE
1) Judge's personal law clerks
2) Most experienced staff atty
3) Least experienced staff atty
4) Other
WHO REVIEWS TRANSCRIPT
1) Law clerk or staff atty
2) Judge
3) Both
4) Other

allow
allow
withdrawal withdrawal

*110
18

n/a

0

309

0

staff with screening
varying committee
experience
staff
yes
yes
yes

yes

DOES COURT COMB RECORD AND
RAISE ARGUABLE POINTS ITSELF

yes

yes

yes
yes

yes

IN ANDERS CASE, DOES COURT
1) Conference case
2) Circulate w/o conference

KS
App.
Ct.
10
650

308

IS STAFF MEMO PREPARED

IF IT FINDS UNRAISED ARGUABLE
POINTS, DOES COURT
1) Order new brief
2) Appoint new counsel
3) Determine issues sua sponte

KS
S.
Ct.

sometimes
yes

yes

IS A WRITTEN OPINION REQUIRED

no

no

IS TIME DEVOTED TO ANDERS CASE
1) More than the average case
2) About the same as average
3) Less than average

xxx

xxx

308. Iowa Appellate Court. Iowa applies a deflective procedure whereby all appeals are filed
in the supreme court, which then decides to transfer certain cases to the intermediate appellate
court based on established screening criteria. The supreme court disposes of Anders cases before
the transfer decisions are made. Consequently, the intermediate court does not review no-merit
appeals.
309. Kansas Supreme Court. The Chief Justice reported that in his seventeen years of service
on the court, he had not seen more than two or three Anders-type cases come before the court.
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3
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yes

yes

yes

yes
staff dir.

yes

yes

no

yes

yes

yes

yes

yes

RAISE ARGUABLE POINTS ITSELF

no

yes

yes

yes

no310

yes

IF IT FINDS UNRAISED ARGUABLE
POINTS, DOES COURT
1) Order new brief
2) Appoint new counsel
3) Determine issues sua sponte

yes

yes

yes

yes

yes
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varies
varies

IS STAFF MEMO PREPARED
DOES COURT COMB RECORD AND

sometimes

IN ANDERS CASE, DOES COURT
1) Conference case
2) Circulate w/o conference

yes

IS A WRITTEN OPINION REQUIRED

yes

no

yes

xxx

xxx

xxx

IS TIME DEVOTED TO ANDERS CASE
1) More than the average case
2) About the same as average
3) Less than average

yes

yes

generally

yes
yes

yes

yes

yes

xxx
xxx
xxx

310. Louisiana Fourth Circuit Court of Appeal. While the court reviews the record for
arguable appellate issues that may not have been raised by appointed counsel, Judge Patrick Schott
indicated that he would not use the word "comb" to describe the review process.
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staff
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IN ANDERS CASE, DOES COURT
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MN
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Ct.
7
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Ct.
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MO

MT

NE

S. Ct.

S. Ct.
7

S. Ct.
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does not
allow

200
*6

does not
allow

0

withdrawal

3

withdrawal

staff atty
yes

yes

IS STAFF MEMO PREPARED

yes

yes

DOES COURT COMB RECORD AND
RAISE ARGUABLE POINTS ITSELF

yes

yes
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POINTS, DOES COURT
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yes
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2) Appoint new counsel
3) Determine issues sua sponte
IN ANDERS CASE, DOES COURT
1) Conference case
2) Circulate w/o conference

yes

IS A WRITTEN OPINION REQUIRED

no
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xxx
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311. Minnesota Supreme and Appellate Court. Both the supreme court and the court of
appeals report that their centralized state public defender system provides all convicted felons with
counsel for appeal without involvement of the court in the process of evaluating the merits.
312. Montana Supreme Court. The case is reviewed by the only staff attorney on the court.
On the one occasion in which arguable merit was found in an unraised point, the case was
remanded for appointment of new counsel.
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xxx

313. Nebraska Court of Appeals. The Chief Judge reports that he could recall the filing of
only one Anders brief within the last two years.
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IF IT FINDS UNRAISED ARGUABLE
POINTS, DOES COURT
1) Order new brief
2) Appoint new counsel
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IS TIME DEVOTED TO ANDERS CASE
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314. New York Supreme Court, Appellate Division, Second Judicial Department. Court
attorneys and judges' law clerks are assigned Anders cases based on length and nature of the case.
315. New York Supreme Court, Appellate Division, Third Judicial Department. Internal
court policy requires written opinions.
316. New York Supreme Court, Appellate Division, Second Judicial Department. Most
Anders cases thus far have involved plea proceedings.
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317. North Carolina Supreme Court. Within the court’s recollection, no arguable points other
than those mentioned in the brief have ever been found.
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OH
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5

OH
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8

OH
11th
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4
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*200
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*2
0.7

0

yes
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yes

yes
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yes
yes
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2) About the same as average
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318. Ohio Ninth District Court of Appeals. The court reports the filing of only one Anders
brief in the last four years. The responding staff attorney attributed this to a belief by attorneys
that the court did not like to receive Anders briefs.
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5

discret.

2654

3222
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staff321

yes
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no
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no

yes

yes

yes322

yes

no

yes

yes

yes

*323

n/a

varies

yes

IN ANDERS CASE, DOES COURT
1) Conference case
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yes
yes
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IS A WRITTEN OPINION REQUIRED

yes
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IS TIME DEVOTED TO ANDERS CASE
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no

xxx
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319. Oregon Court of Appeals. While the court does not permit withdrawal of attorneys and
requires them to file a brief in conformance with State v. Balfour, 814 P.2d 1069 (1991), the court
answered the questionnaire by providing its method of handling these Balfour briefs.
320. Pennsylvania Superior Court. The court's central legal staff initially reviews an Anders brief
for compliance with procedural requirements and prepares a short memo. The case is then treated as
any other criminal case, and the judge's law clerks address the merits.
321. South Carolina Supreme Court. Staff attorneys with at least six months’ experience are
assigned to Anders cases.
322. Ohio Twelfth District Court of Appeals. The survey response states, "We 'review' the
record. 'Comb' might be too strong a term."
323. Oklahoma Court of Criminal Appeals. Thus far, the court has not addressed the issue of
what occurs when the court finds points of arguable error not addressed in the Anders brief.
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yes

yes

TX
1st
DCA
9

TX
2d
DCA
7

TX
3d
DCA
6

TX
4th
DCA
7

yes

staff

yes

yes

yes

IS STAFF MEMO PREPARED
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yes

yes

yes

no325

no

DOES COURT COMB RECORD AND
RAISE ARGUABLE POINTS ITSELF
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yes
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yes

yes

yes

yes

yes

yes

yes

yes

yes
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xxx
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IF IT FINDS UNRAISED ARGUABLE
POINTS, DOES COURT
1) Order new brief
2) Appoint new counsel
3) Determine issues sua sponte

yes
yes

IN ANDERS CASE, DOES COURT
1) Conference case
2) Circulate w/o conference

yes

IS A WRITTEN OPINION REQUIRED
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no

yes
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IS TIME DEVOTED TO ANDERS CASE
1) More than the average case
2) About the same as average
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xxx

324. Tennessee Court of Criminal Appeals. The survey response noted the filing of only one
Anders brief in the last fifteen years.
325. Texas Third Court of Appeals. The staff attorney prepares a draft opinion in lieu of a
memo.
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3) Determine issues sua sponte

yes

yes

yes

yes

yes

yes

IN ANDERS CASE, DOES COURT
1) Conference case
2) Circulate w/o conference

yes

yes

yes

yes

yes

yes

IS A WRITTEN OPINION REQUIRED

yes

yes

yes

yes

yes

yes

IS TIME DEVOTED TO ANDERS CASE
1) More than the average case
2) About the same as average
3) Less than average

xxx
xxx

xxx

xxx

xxx

xxx
xxx

326. Texas Fifth District Court of Appeals. The court has noticed a great fluctuation in
Anders briefs over the last three years. Originally, the court would refer all Anders cases to their
most senior staff attorneys, who would prepare draft opinions and circulate them to the assigned
panel without a conference. This procedure became unsatisfactory for cases involving meritorious
points. The court's current procedure distinguishes between "pure" Anders cases without
arguable points of error and those with arguable points. The former is assigned to a midlevel staff
attorney for preparation of a draft opinion; the latter is handled as any other criminal appeal.
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ANDERS IN THE FIFTY STATES

STATE
Court
No. of Judges on Court

TX

TX

11th DCA 12th DCA
3
3

685

TX
13th
DCA
6

TX
14th
DCA
9

200

115

350

800

No. of Anders appeals
Anders cases as a % of total

*10
5

*5-10
4 to 8

*25
7.1

21
2.6

STAFF USED TO REVIEW CASE
1) Judge's personal law clerks
2) Most experienced staff atty
3) Least experienced staff atty
4) Other

yes

yes

yes

yes

NO. OF CRIMINAL CASES PER YEAR

WHO REVIEWS TRANSCRIPT
1) Law clerk or staff atty
2) Judge
3) Both
4) Other

UT
VT
App.
Ct. S. Ct.
7
5
130
15

*0327

yes
yes
yes

yes
sometimes
yes

yes

yes

yes

yes

IS STAFF MEMO PREPARED

yes

draft op.

yes

no

yes

yes

DOES COURT COMB RECORD AND
RAISE ARGUABLE POINTS ITSELF

yes

yes

yes

no

yes

yes

IF IT FINDS UNRAISED ARGUABLE
POINTS, DOES COURT
1) Order new brief
2) Appoint new counsel
3) Determine issues sua sponte
IN ANDERS CASE, DOES COURT
1) Conference case
2) Circulate w/o conference
IS A WRITTEN OPINION REQUIRED
IS TIME DEVOTED TO ANDERS CASE
1) More than the average case
2) About the same as average
3) Less than average

yes

yes
yes

sometimes
treated as
any other
case

yes

yes

yes

yes

yes

yes

yes

yes

no

xxx

xxx

xxx

xxx

xxx

no

xxx

327. Vermont Supreme Court. The court reports that no Anders cases have been filed, but
that it anticipates the filing of some in the future.
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FLORIDA STATE UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

STATE
Court
No. of Judges on Court
NO. OF CRIMINAL CASES PER YEAR
No. of Anders appeals
Anders cases as a % of total
STAFF USED TO REVIEW CASE
1) Judge's personal law clerks
2) Most experienced staff atty
3) Least experienced staff atty
4) Other
WHO REVIEWS TRANSCRIPT
1) Law clerk or staff atty
2) Judge
3) Both
4) Other
IS STAFF MEMO PREPARED

VA
S. Ct.
7
639
*20
3.1
yes
yes

VA

WA

1800
*180
10

839
73
8.7

yes
yes

yes
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WA
WA
App. App. Div.
App. Ct. App. Div. I Div. II
III
10
9
6
4

yes
available

750
51
6.8

299
*60-70
23.4

comm'r

comm'r

comm'r

comm'r

yes
yes

yes

usually not

yes

yes

no

yes

yes328

yes

yes

yes

n/a

yes

sometimes
sometimes
most often

yes

yes
sometimes

yes

yes

no

yes

DOES COURT COMB RECORD AND
RAISE ARGUABLE POINTS ITSELF
IF IT FINDS UNRAISED ARGUABLE
POINTS, DOES COURT
1) Order new brief
2) Appoint new counsel
3) Determine issues sua sponte
IN ANDERS CASE, DOES COURT
1) Conference case
2) Circulate w/o conference

yes

IS A WRITTEN OPINION REQUIRED

no

IS TIME DEVOTED TO ANDERS CASE
1) More than the average case
2) About the same as average
3) Less than average

yes329
yes

yes

xxx
xxx
xxx

xxx

xxx

328. Virginia Court of Appeals. The court reviews the record for only issues that were
preserved and appear to have merit. With respect to whether the court appoints counsel or orders
additional briefing when arguable points are found, the survey response states that it is up to the
judge to whom the case is assigned. "Since we have a petition for appeal process, most likely the
court would grant an appeal on that issue(s) and deny counsel's request to withdraw, forcing the
same counsel to brief the issues on appeal."
329. Washington Court of Appeals, Second Division. "A panel of judges will look at the case
if the commissioner who first reviews it determines that there are issues that are not clearly
without merit, or if the appellant seeks modification of the commissioner's decision."
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STATE
Court
No. of Judges on Court
NO. OF CRIMINAL CASES PER YEAR
No. of Anders appeals
Anders cases as a % of total
STAFF USED TO REVIEW CASE
1) Judge's personal law clerks
2) Most experienced staff atty
3) Least experienced staff atty
4) Other
WHO REVIEWS TRANSCRIPT
1) Law clerk or staff atty
2) Judge
3) Both
4) Other

WV

WI

WI

175

discret.

1264

115

0330

juris.

201
15.9

0

S. Ct.
5

WY
S.
S. Ct. App. Ct. Ct.
16
5

yes
yes
staff atty

staff atty

yes

yes
available
yes

IS STAFF MEMO PREPARED

yes

*331

yes

DOES COURT COMB RECORD AND
RAISE ARGUABLE POINTS ITSELF

yes

yes

no

IF IT FINDS UNRAISED ARGUABLE
POINTS, DOES COURT
1) Order new brief
2) Appoint new counsel
3) Determine issues sua sponte

yes
up to P.D.

IN ANDERS CASE, DOES COURT
1) Conference case
2) Circulate w/o conference

yes

IS A WRITTEN OPINION REQUIRED

yes

IS TIME DEVOTED TO ANDERS CASE
1) More than the average case
2) About the same as average
3) Less than average

687

yes
yes
yes

yes
n/a

xxx
xxx

330. West Virginia Supreme Court of Appeals. The survey response indicated that only one
Anders petition had been filed in the court. It was treated as any other criminal appeal.
331. Wisconsin Court of Appeals. The staff attorney prepares a draft opinion or order
affirming the judgment if no arguable merit is discovered. If the attorney discovers an issue with
potential merit, he or she submits a recommendation to the assigned panel.

